Law Reform in the Emerging Nations of Sub-Saharan Afica: Social Change and the Development of the Modern Legal System by Sedler, Robert A.
Masthead Logo
Wayne State University
Law Faculty Research Publications Law School
1-1-1968
Law Reform in the Emerging Nations of Sub-
Saharan Afica: Social Change and the
Development of the Modern Legal System
Robert A. Sedler
Wayne State University
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Research Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@WayneState.
Recommended Citation
Robert Allen Sedler, Law Reform in the Emerging Nations of Sub-Saharan Afica: Social Change and the Development of the Modern
Legal System, 13 St. Louis U. L.J. 195, 257 (1968)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/lawfrp/443
LAW REFORM IN THE EMERGING NATIONS OF SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA: SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN LEGAL SYSTEM
ROBERT ALLEN SEDLER*
INTRODUCTION
Most discussions of law reform revolve around changes in the law
of a "developed" legal system. By the term, "developed legal sys-
tem," we mean one that has a well-defined body of law and
established institutions administering that law. The changes brought
about by law reform will take place within that framework, and
when such a system is examined in perspective, it is clear that law
reform has been an ongoing process. The Anglo-American system
as we know it-the content of its law and the nature of its legal
institutions-has been the product of gradual and evolutionary
growth.1 The development of the system has paralleled the develop-
ment of the nation as a whole. As new societal institutions are
created, new needs appear, and the law develops in response to those
needs. Likewise societal values change, and as they do, there are
changes in the legal system to reflect the new values. 2 For example,
it is now recognized that, on the whole, the law of negligence was
developed with a view toward meeting the problems of industrial
activity and mechanization and was designed to limit the liability of
new enterprises. 3 As those enterprises became more secure and the
risks of capital investment were somewhat reduced, different pres-
sures were put on the legal system, and in response to them a law
relating to industrial accidents emerged, of which Workmen's Com-
pensation, for example, is a part. Values had changed, and there was
greater concern for the victim of industrialization and renewed
emphasis on the apportionment of loss resulting from industrial
* A.B., J.D., University of Pittsburgh; Professor of Law, University
of Kentucky College of Law. The author was Assistant Dean and Associate
Professor of Law at Haile Sellassie I University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from
1963-1966.
1. Dean Pound has traced this growth from the stage of primitive law,
to strict law, to equity, and finally to the stage of maturity. POUND, JuRIS-
PRUDENCE 367-456 (1959).
2. For a discussion of the relationship between public opinion and new
law see FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 10-12 (1959). See gener-
ally DIcEY, LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND (2d ed., 1963).
3. The concern with limiting liability is demonstrated by judicial opin-
ions such as those in Winterbottom v. Wright, [1842] 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng.
Rep. 402, and Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks, [1856] 11 Excheq. 781, 156
Eng. Rep. 1047. And see the view that "the price of progress cannot be with-
held," expressed in Beatty v. Central Iowa Ry., 58 Iowa 242, 12 N.W. 332
(1882).
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activity.4 The present trend to strict liability for harm caused by
product use is a further illustration of legal change in response to
changing needs and values. 5 The law reform that has taken place
has been evolutionary and has been within the framework of an
established legal system. An entirely different type of law reform
must take place in the emerging nations of sub-Saharan Africa.6
This type of law reform is revolutionary in nature and will occur in
the context of the development of a modern legal system.
At present the emerging nations of sub-Saharan Africa have
undertaken a process of planned societal and economic development.
They are trying to transform and modernize their societies and
economies as rapidly as possible so that they may enjoy "all the good
things which western civilization has produced in the two millennia
of its history. '7 These nations are in the throes of the "revolution of
rising expectations. '8 A desire for "equality" in this sense is a
motivating force making for social and economic change,9 and the
concept of modernization-perhaps a legacy of western colonialism' 0-
is seen as the means of reaching that goal. Thus, there will be
planned economic development, and it is assumed without question
that the government has the responsibility to see that it takes place."
A major effort is being undertaken to completely modernize the
subsistence economy under which the majority of Africans live,12
with its deleterious economic, social and psychological effects.' 8 The
government is investing heavily in the public sector of the economy-
roads, hospitals, schools, electrical systems, dams and so forth are
being built as rapidly as revenues and external assistance will per-
mit.'4 Efforts also are being made to obtain foreign capital invest-
4. The theory of Workmen's Compensation is said to be that "the cost
of the product should bear the blood of the workman." Bohlen, A Problem
in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HARV. L. REV. 328, 401
(1912),
5. See the discussion in PROSSER, TORTS 672-74 (3rd ed., 1964).
6. The term sub-Saharan is designed to exclude the Arabic nations of
North Africa and the United Arab Republic. Some African states are pre-
dominantly Moslem, and in those states an additional dimension is presented
in regard to the reform of Islamic law. In the present paper we will be dis-
cussing reform of Islamic law only tangentially. On that subject see gener-,
ally ANDERSON, ISLAMIC LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD (1959).
7. SPIRO, POLITICS IN AFRICA: PROSPECTS SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 6 (1963).
8. "Africans demand better education, better health standards, better
roads, water and electricity; better houses, more and better food and clothing,
automobiles and bicycles, radios and television. And they demand them now.
In short, Africans demand development." Seidman, Law and Economic De-
velopment in Independent, English-Speaking, Sub-Saharan Africa, 1966 Wis.
L. REV. 999, 1018.
9. WARD, THE RICH NATIONS AND THE POOR NATIONS 14-15 (1962).
10. "The great world-wide transmitter of modernizing tendency has been
without doubt-for good and evil-Western colonialism." Id. at 51.
11. See the discussion in KAMARCK, THE ECONOMICS OF AFRICAN DEVELOP-
MENT 16-17 (1967). See also Harvey, The Challenge of the Rule of Law, 59
MICH. L. REV. 603, 612 (1961).
12. KAMARCK, supra note 11, at 33.
13. Id. at 34. This will be discussed in greater detail, infra.
14. In most African nations current government expenditures usually run
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ment on an extensive scale. 15 It is this economic development and
modernization which is the focal concern of the emerging nations of
sub-Saharan Africa.
A necessary concomitant of planned economic development and
modernization is radical social change. The change from a sub-
sistence to a money economy has profound social implications for
the family structure, which has revolved around the subsistence
economy. 16 So too, education and exposure to new ideas call into
question familial and tribal loyalties. Significant migration from
rural to urban areas also occurs, and many nations are becoming
increasingly urbanized.' 7 Patterns of behavior are altered as a re-
sult of new opportunities that have become available. The modern-
ization process itself increases tensions, produces frustration and in
general creates psychological and social problems.18  The peoples'
way of life is being transformed, and so is the nature of the society
itself.
As part of this planned development the legal system must be
reformed so as to be one that is suitable for the new society which is
being established. The legal system that exists was necessarily de-
signed to meet the needs of the existing society,' 9 and it is clear
that it will be inadequate to meet the needs of the new one.20 In its
present state it is not capable of providing the solutions for the new
kinds of legal, social and economic problems that must be faced. The
existing legal system may also be "underdeveloped" in the sense that
a well-defined body of law applicable to all persons is lacking and
that the institutions administering the law and the boundaries of
power between them have not been clearly defined. The fundamental
question of what the law will be and what institutions will administer
between 15-20% of gross national expenditures. When the operations of utili-
ties, ports and the like, which are generally government-owned, are included,
along with the investment in the whole public sector, the total approaches
one-third. Id. at 35.
15. And, of course, external assistance from foreign governments, in-
ternational organizations, foundations, and so forth.
16. This will be discussed in greater detail, infra.
17. In many of the leading cities growth is taking place at a rate in excess
of the absorptive capacity. HANCE, AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 5 (1967).
18. See the discussion and review of studies in Milner, M'Naghten and
the Witch Doctor: Psychiatry and Crime in Africa, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1134,
1139-40 (1967).
19. And insofar as the country was formerly under colonial rule, par-
ticularly the needs of the colonial power. See generally the discussion in
Seidman, supra note 8, at 1005-15.
20. If for no other reason than the fact that the received law was de-
veloped with a view toward the objectives of the colonial power and that
African law was not permitted to evolve naturally. See the discussion of the
latter point in ALLOTT, ESSAYS IN AFRICAN LAW 56 (1960). More importantly,
revolutionary change is being planned, which necessarily betokens the estab-
lishment of a new legal system to reflect such change. It was for this reason
that completely new legal systems were established in Turkey following the
Ataturk revolution and in Japan following the Meiji Restoration. See the
discussion in Sedler, The Development of Legal Systems: The Ethiopian Ex-
perience, 53 IOWA L. REV. 562, 566-67 (1967).
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it remain to be definitively determined. It is the fact that these
questions are unanswered that marks the difference between a de-
veloped and what we may call a developing legal system.21
More significantly, there is no time for the law to evolve grad-
ually in response to societal needs as they appear at a given time.
The weaknesses in the existing system are all too apparent, and a
new legal system must be established as a part of the process of
planned development. It is in this context that the matter of law
reform in the emerging nations of sub-Saharan Africa must be con-
sidered. Law reform will take place as a part of the establishment
of a modern legal system, designed to meet the needs of a society
going through revolutionary and planned development.
This legal system must take account of the social change that has
been occurring as a result of planned development and modernization.
Moreover, if it is to be enduring, it must have the necessary flex-
ibility to anticipate and adapt to the further changes in values and
ways of living that will occur as the process continues. In this sense
the legal system must accommodate itself to existing and anticipated
social change. Therefore, one dimension of law reform that we will
consider is the accommodation of law to ongoing social change as a
part of the establishment of a modern legal system.
Another dimension of law reform, particularly important in de-
veloping countries, involves the role of law in engineering social
change. The issue is whether the law itself may be employed to
bring about the changes in behavior patterns and ways of living
that are considered necessary for the development of the new and
modern society. We are familiar with the use of law to deal with
particular social and economic problems as they appear. A labor
relations law will change the relative power of workers and manage-
ment, thereby attempting to solve the problems created by the
inequality of bargaining power. Zoning laws will change the way in
which property is used.2 2 But on the whole, we have not attempted
to employ the legal process to change the very way in which people
live their lives and to lead them into completely new patterns of
behavior. Our law of the family, for example, reflects our societal
values concerning stable family life. Monogamous marriage his-
torically was a religious and social command, and this institution
forms the basis of our law of marriage and divorce. The law did not
attempt to impose this type of marriage on a people whose values
21. As the term, "developed legal system," is used in this context, it is
clear that a number of "developing nations" have "developed legal systems."
Many nations of Latin America, the Middle East and Asia can be said to be
"developing" in the economic sense, but their legal systems are as "devel-
oped" as those of the economically advanced countries. India or Brazil would
furnish a good example. In these countries law reform will also take place,
but it will be in the context of the reform of a developed legal system.
22. See the discussion in FBIEmmANK, supra note 2, at 4-5.
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and beliefs dictated plural marriage. Our economic system developed
with little interference from the legal order; and, only after a basic
structure was established, did the law attempt to regulate economic
activity. But even then no radical innovation occurred, such as
changing the method of land ownership and use 23 or converting
subsistence agriculture into market agriculture. In retrospect, it is
clear that our economic and social patterns of behavior evolved with
little impetus from the legal order and that the law accommodated
itself to existing patterns. Changes in law generally came only after
changes in behavior patterns, or at least after changes in values,
which then called for new behavior patterns.24 We have seen the
law develop in response to social change, and we have also seen the
law employed to deal with particular social problems. However, we
have not seen the law employed as an instrument to bring about
radical social reordering, to the point of completely transforming the
economic and social structure of the society. And to the extent that
the application of the law threatens to bring about such a reordering
great resistance is encountered.
2
Evolutionary changes in response to changed values and the
pressures of public opinion may be said, then, to represent the
conception of law reform in the developed nations of the world. It
is, therefore, important that we understand that law reform may
have an entirely different connotation in the nations which are in the
process of rapid social and economic development, for here the law
may be viewed as an instrument of social control in its broadest sense.
A primary function of law may be to engineer the social and economic
change necessary to achieve the goals of development. If these
nations are to enter the modern world and to attain the benefits that
modern civilization can offer, the nature of the existing society must
be significantly altered. The question is whether this can be done
through the processes of the law. We have long recognized that law
is a device for social ordering,26 but in the emerging nations of sub-
Saharan Africa the question is whether law can be used to completely
alter a peoples' way of life.
23. Our basic body of property law, in fact, developed in response to the
requirements of the feudal system. This explains why a law of property
came into being before other branches of private law. POTTER, AN HISTORICAL
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 30-31 (Kiralfy ed., 1958).
24. We must always remember that there may be a difference between
the real values held by the people and officially approved values. Patterns of
behavior are more likely to follow the real values except to the extent that
official approval or disapproval itself may influence behavior patterns.
25. The prohibiting of government-required segregation following the de-
cision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and its progeny,
would be considered only a step toward changing the pattern of Negro-white
relationships in the South. And yet it has met with unprecedented resistance.
26. One of the "law jobs" is preventive channeling and the reorientation
of conduct and expectations. LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY
294-97 (1941). See also the discussion in HARVEY, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN GHANA 344 (1966).
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If law is to be used for this purpose, it must necessarily run
counter to the values reflected in the existing way of life. This is
contrary to our conception of law as deriving its value content from
the values of the people to whom it applies. But, as Professor Harvey
has pointed out, "[i] t is possible for law to draw its value content
from the acceptances of an elite group that has succeeded in monopo-
lizing the function of manipulating the technique and is using it to
achieve social change. '27 This is the situation that prevails in the
emerging nations of sub-Saharan Africa. The values of modernization
and economic progress of which we have been speaking are the val-
ues of an elite that is in control of the development of these countries.
Nowhere else is the distinction so marked between a small governing
elite and the great mass of the population. This has nothing to do
with the form of government in a particular country-it is as true in
a monarchy like Ethiopia as it is in a relatively democratic govern-
ment like Kenya. It stems from the conditions of African life, in
which the great mass of people remained tied to the subsistence
economy and traditional living while a small number, through educa-
tion and exposure to the modern world, have acquired entirely
different values. 2  Upon independence the educated elite succeeded
to the political control formerly exercised by the colonial power. 29
It is they who have made the decision for development and modern-
ization; and in order to achieve this objective, they must impose their
values, at least in part, on the bulk of the population, a population
which is largely illiterate, living on a subsistence level and following
the traditional way of life.
They may seek to impose these values through the processes of
law and to employ the law as a means of accelerating social change in
order that the goal of development and modernization may be
achieved. The second dimension of law reform that we will consider
then is the use of law as a means of accelerating social change in the
developing society. As part of that consideration we will also focus
on law reform as it relates directly to economic development.
27. Id. at 346.
28. "In all African countries there are two distinct societies to an extent
unknown in Europe or North America, and a rule that is appropriate to the
one will probably be totally inappropriate to the other." GOWER, INDEPENDENT
AFRICA 3-4 (1967).
29. In countries such as Ethiopia and Liberia, which had not been brought
under colonial rule, the educated elite exercises control in this sense because
those who hold the reins of government have made a decision for moderniza-
tion. But in Ethiopia particularly, the power of the educated elite is counter-
balanced by the influence of traditional political leaders, who may or may
not be in sympathy with the values of modernization.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE
ACCOMODATION OF LAW TO SOCIAL CHANGE
A. The Pluralistic Legal Order
All but two of the emerging nations of sub-Saharan Africa have
only recently achieved independence.30 As a result of their colonial
past they "inherited" a legal system. That system was pluralistic in
nature, with the laws and legal institutions consisting of those which
had been "received" from the colonial power and those which were
"indigenous" to the African state. The legal system at the time
when an African nation became independent has been described
as follows:
The colonial power introduced its own metropolitan law, or a vari-
ant of it, into its newly acquired African territory. The general
or territorial legal system thus created usually applied throughout
the territory and to all its inhabitants; but there were very substan-
tial exceptions, at least in the British territories, in favor of the indig-
enous populations, who, by the relevant legislation, remained
largely subjected to their own local and customary laws. This was
especially true in those areas of life where the most direct conflict
would otherwise arise between imported and indigenous law, for
example, in the law of the family, of marriage and divorce, the law
of property and succession, and the law of civil and criminal wrongs.
Nor was this all: the British also recognized, and made official in-
struments of their colonial rule, the indigenous tribunals which ad-
ministered justice to the African populations. The institution or
recognition of a native court system in parallel with the system of
territorial or western-law courts obviously did an enormous amount
to build in and maintain the dualism of laws.3 1
Thus, just as the American colonies "received" the "Law of England,"
so was it "received" in the British colonies of sub-Saharan Africa.
3 2
This received law included the common law, principles of equity and
statutes of general application. 3 The nature and extent of the
reception in Africa is a subject of great debate and has given rise to a
number of problems, a discussion of most of which is beyond the
scope of this writing.3 4 It was this law which formed the "general"
30. See note 29, supra. This exception must be borne in mind, since we
will continually be making reference to the law received from the colonial
power. I have described the development of Ethiopia's legal system elsewhere.
See note 20, supra. Liberia voluntarily adopted the common law as its main
body of law and has always maintained a separate system of customary law for
the non-assimilated indigenous population. See ALLOTT, supra note 20, at
11-12.
31. Allott, Toward the Unification of Laws in Africa, 14 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 366, 370 (1965).
32. For a discussion of how this law was received, see ALLOTT, supra
note 20, at 3-10. A somewhat different method of reception took place in the
Sudan. See Guttman, The Reception of the Common Law in the Sudan, 6
INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 401 (1957). In a few of the ceded colonies and protec-
torates, some other general body of law was received, such as Roman-Dutch
law in Basutoland.
33. This was the "common form phrase" denoting the received Eng-
lish law.
34. See generally ALLOTT, supra note 20, at 3-10; DANIELS, THE COMMON
LAND IN WEST AFRICA 109-48 (1964); PARK, THE SOURCES OF NIGERIAx LAW
14-42 (1963).
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law of the system, along with the penal codes and similar legislation
which were later promulgated for the colonies, and legislation
enacted by the colonial legislatures. In the French colonies, French
Codes were imposed and provided a droit commun throughout French
West Africa and French Equatorial Africa.3 5  In the other African
colonies, the law of the colonial power was also imposed.3 6
An equally important component of the legal system was
customary law. In every society norms of conduct have grown up,
some of which are obligatory, and therefore, may be said to have the
force of law-hence the concept of customary law.37 It was this law
that provided the needed social control in the traditional African
society. Professor Allott has described customary law in the follow-
ing way.38 It is unwritten, and the rules can be traced to the
customs and practices of the people which have been handed down to
succeeding generations. The law consists of different bodies of rules
that may be invoked in different contexts. These rules are based on
conceptions of morality and depend for their effectiveness on the
approval and consent of the people. The law has evolved in response
to the pressures put upon the people by their way of life and their
adjustment to life in the particular community. Professor Allott
also contends that all unwritten customary laws, African or otherwise,
resemble each other more than any single customary system re-
sembles any written system.39  Moreover, customary law cannot be
separated from the traditional method of dispute resolution. This
involved conciliation and compromise as well as adjudication. The
law was more of a guide to the resolution of disputes than a series of
binding norms, and the judgment in a given case found its support
in the consensus of the community. 40  It was the method of dispute
resolution which gave effect to the norms of the customary law, and
we shall have more to say about this subsequently.
Customary law was extremely important in the British colonies
35. See Farnsworth, Law Reform in a Developing Country: A New Code
of Obligations for Senegal, 8 J. AFR. L. 6, 7 (1964). For a general discussion of
the legal systems of the French colonies during the colonial period, see Pageard,
La r~forme des juridictions coutumi~res et musulmanes dan les noveaus etats
de l'Ouest africain, 1963 RECUEIL PENANT 462, 463-66.
36. See Crabb, The Environment and Nature of the Legal System of
Congo-Kinshasa, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 1125, 1139-42.
37. See the discussion of the distinction between obligatory and nonob-
ligatory norms in NWABUEZE, MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN NIGERIA 3 (1963). As
Hoebel put it, "A social norm is legal if its neglect or infraction is regularly
met, in threat or in fact, by the application of physical force by an individual
or group possessing the socially recognized privilege of so acting." HOEBEL,
THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 28 (1954). See also ELIAS, THE NATURE OF
AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 60-75 (1956).
38. The discussion that follows is taken from ALLOTT, supra note 20,
at 55-68.
39. Id. at 63. See also PROCEEDINGS OF THE AFRICAN CONFERENCE ON
LOCAL COURTS AND CUSTOMARY LAW 20-24 (1960).
40. ALLOTT, supra note 20, at 68. See generally ELIAS, supra note 37,
ch. 12.
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and was a key element in the policy of "indirect rule." This policy
required that the customs and traditions of the African population
should be interfered with as little as possible and that authority
should be exercised through the traditional rulers.41 As a result,
most disputes between Africans were generally governed by custom-
ary law and were heard in the customary or "Native" courts. 42 How-
ever, ultimate control was retained by the colonial government in
a number of ways. The relationship between what may be called
"English" law and customary law was horizontal in the sense that
the boundaries of each were defined and substantial areas of activity
were assigned to customary law.43 But it was also vertical or hier-
archical in the sense that the English law and government courts were
the "superior" part of the system.44 In every pluralistic system there
is an irreducible minimum of hierarchical ordering, if for no other
reason than that the respective spheres of application between the
two bodies of law must be defined. Even within the areas assigned
to customary law, certain cases might be governed by English law,45
and customary law was not to be applied where it was "repugnant to
natural justice, equity and good conscience" 46 or "incompatible either
directly or by necessary implication with any legislation for the time
being in force." Determinations of repugnancy or incompatibility
were to be made by the government courts, staffed primarily by Eng-
lish judges.4 7 Nonetheless, notwithstanding its being subject to the
control of the colonial power, customary law was a very important
part of the legal system and furnished the grounds for decision in most
disputes between Africans.
Customary law was also applied in the French colonies, but it
was of much less significance because of the French policy of direct
rule. The French sought to destroy the power of the indigenous
rulers48 and to create a sense of French rather than African identity.
The goal was to establish an indigenous elite who achieved legal
rights by conforming to French cultural (and of course linguistic)
patterns.49 The legal system carefully distinguished between the
evolu& and the native. French nationals and evolu~s were governed
in all respects by the received French law. Non-assimilated natives
41. GowER, supra note 28, at 6-8.
42. See generally ALLOTT, supra note 20, ch. 7.
43. For a discussion of horizontal and vertical ordering in a pluralistic
legal system, see HARVEY, supra note 26, at 240-41.
44. Id. at 243-45.
45. Such as where the case involved a transaction between a native and
a non-native, or where the transaction did not "lend itself to the application of
customary law so that the parties must presumably have intended to be bound
by English law."
46. This concept is analyzed in Caplan, The Making of "Natural Justice
in British Africa:" An Exercise in Comparative Law, 13 J. PUB. L. 120 (1964).
47. HARVEY, supra note 26, at 244. For a discussion of this "stranger in
a foreign land," see Caplan, supra, note 46 at 129-32.
48. GOWER, supra note 28, at 8-9.
49. Farnsworth, supra note 35, at 15.
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were governed by customary law in matters of family law, property
and succession, but were still subject to French law in other matters.
There were also customary courts with jurisdiction in cases governed
by cutomary law and limited jurisdiction in cases governed by
French civil and commercial law.50 Customary law never achieved
the same importance in French Africa as in the British colonies, and
it had declined in importance there even before independence.51 For
this reason the pluralistic nature of the legal order and its effect on
the modern legal system can best be considered with reference to the
former British colonies.
5 2
The achieving of independence may be said to constitute a
revolutionary change in the nature of the existing society. The
educated African elite-in one political form or another-now have
the reins of power and intend to use that power to lead the nation
into rapid economic development and modernization. As part of this
process of revolutionary change attention must be given to reform of
the existing legal system, for that system was established in a colonial
context to meet the objectives of the colonial power. The system
must be reformed so that it will be suitable for an independent
nation embarking upon planned economic development and modern-
ization.
The fact that the legal system will be reformed to meet these
new objectives does not necessarily mean that the structure of the
present system will be abolished. Indeed, the opposite has almost
universally been true. Upon achieving independence, fundamental
changes must be made in the political system in order to transfer the
power from the colonial rulers to the leaders of the independent
nation, but the almost invariable practice has been for a new state to
retain the structure of the legal system that existed prior to inde-
pendence. On July 5, 1776, the political system in the former
American colonies had been altered, but the basic legal system that
was in effect on July 3rd remained in effect on July 5th and has
continued in the same form up to the present day. The primary
source of law in the American states was and is still the common law
that was originally "received" from England, and we speak of the
''common law system." This was true of other countries that were
former British colonies such as Canada (except Quebec), Australia,
India, Singapore and so forth. Whereas, in North American states
like Quebec and Louisiana that were under French rule, codes form
the primary source of law, and these states are said to have the
"civil law system." So too, upon attaining independence the African
50. Paegard, supra note 35, at 463-64.
51. Farnsworth, supra note 35, at 14.
52. In the French colonies customary law is clearly on the way out, and
it is likely that in the future a series of codes of universal application will
be enacted. See the discussion of post-independence development in the former
French colonies in Sedler, supra note 20, at 593-94.
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states have retained with little change the structure of the legal
system that was "inherited" from the colonial rulers.
53
This is understandable and, on the whole, desirable. The persons
who will be directing the development of the legal system, and who
will be responsible for its reform, have received their training in
whatever law made up the essential elements of the existing system.
Legal concepts and ideas based on that system have emerged, and
the present body of law and legal institutions can serve as the
starting point for further development. More importantly, all that
necessarily has been retained is the structure of the existing system.
The crucial issue confronting the independent nation is the extent to
which the substance of the legal system will be changed to meet the
needs of the nation after independence, needs which relate to
economic development and modernization. In other words, the fact
that the structure of the existing legal system has been retained does
not in and of itself have anything to do with law reform. It is what is
done to that system, to the substance of the law and legal institutions,
that is significant. Upon the structure of the existing system a
substantively new and different legal system must be established,
and its establishment must take place with reference to the needs
and values of the particular nation and the ongoing social change
resulting from development and modernization.
When this proposition is applied to the emerging nations of sub-
Saharan Africa, it is complicated by two factors. In theory the
received law was to be applicable "only insofar as local circumstances
permitted," so that the received law should already have been "re-
formed" to comport with African needs, at least as they appeared
when the question of incorporation first arose. Secondly, the in-
herited legal order was a pluralistic one, and there had been a great
deal of interaction between the received law and customary law. A
fundamental question concerns the place of customary law in the
new legal system and whether the pluralistic order is to continue.
With respect to the first factor, while some adaptation may have
taken place during the colonial period, 54 the sad truth is that for the
most part English law as administered in Africa differed very little
from the law administered in England. The received law was
applied without regard to its suitability for local conditions, and as
far as statute law was concerned, was increasingly obsolete.5 5 The
received law of property, for example, embodied the essential capital-
53. See the discussion and examples in Sedler, supra note 20, at 572-75.
54. Mostly in the context of whether an English statute was to be "re-
ceived." One writer is of the opinion that in Nigeria, for example, "only rarely
is an English Act both of general application in England and not prevented
by local circumstances from operating in Nigeria." PARK, supra note 34, at 35.
He estimates that only between 30 and 40 English statutes were received. See
also Guttman, supra note 32, at 411.
55. GOWER, supra note 28, at 29.
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istic notion that ownership could be separated from labor, which ran
counter to the position of customary law, where the right to enjoy
the benefits of property depended upon occupation and cultivation.56
The British legislation of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
which imposed restrictions on the use of property and provided
protection for labor, were never introduced in Africa as "statutes of
general application. ' 57  Legislation enacted by colonial legislatures
tended to be carbon copies of British statutes,5 8 so that both with
respect to received statutes and legislation enacted by the colonial
legislatures, the focal point was the social and economic conditions
prevailing in England rather than Africa.', And the inherited com-
mon law was truly the "law of England" as pronounced by the
English courts. Not only will the received law have to be reformed
to take account of the social change that has occurred in these
societies, but it will also have to be reformed to take account of
African social and economic conditions to begin with.6 0
With respect to the interaction between received law and custom-
ary law, a different picture is presented. Customary law, by its very
nature, is developed in response to the needs and conditions of a
particular people, and as they change, customary law should change
with them. But customary law operating in the purely social con-
text of the life of a people is something much different from custom-
ary law as part of a pluralistic and formalized legal system. We have
earlier observed that customary law was more of a guide to the
resolution of disputes than a series of binding norms. Once it was
incorporated into the legal system and "operated upon" so as to
bring it more in line with British ideas of "law," it could no longer
retain that character. Professor Twining has graphically described
the transformation of customary law:
With the introduction of a local courts system set up and supervised
by the colonial rulers there were radical departures from indigenous
patterns. To a large extent efforts were made to use existing insti-
tutions, but it was easier to do this with peoples who had developed
governmental institutions than with people who had minimal gov-
ernment, just as it was easier to control and influence the settled
agriculturalists than the wandering pastoralists. To everybody the
local courts system presented at least some unfamiliar features and
to some people the whole idea was totally and incomprehensibly
alien. Judicial bodies with defined jurisdiction and fixed personnel
56. Seidman, supra note 8, at 1007.
57. Id. at 1008.
58. GOwER, supra note 28, at 27-28.
59. It does not appear that general legislation was drafted by the British
Parliament with reference to its effect on the colonies. For an illuminating
example of this, see the discussion in KASUNMU AND SALACUSE, NIGERIAN
FAMILY LAW 12 (1966).
60. See the very interesting discussion in Mustafa, The Treatment of
Exemption Clauses by the Sudan Courts, 11 J. AFR. L. 119 (1967). Rules
based on the assumption that a party should read a transportation ticket
have been uncritically applied in the Sudan where over 80% of the popula-
tion is illiterate.
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were superimposed on less clearly defined institutions and often the
geographical area of jurisdiction cut across tribal and even ethnic
boundaries. The personnel of the courts were by no means elders
according to native law and custom and in a number of places Gov-
ernment-appointed chiefs, owing greater allegiance to Government
than to tribe exercised judicial powers. Moreover the functions that
those bodies were required to perform were not identical with those
of the indigenous institutions that were being built on. Most sig-
nificant of all, perhaps, was the creation of a ladder of appeals and
revisions with expatriates stationed at the top of the ladder, and
the provisions, in some instances, enabling the same expatriates to
participate in proceedings at all levels. It was this general over-
lordship of the local courts by European administrators that pro-
vided the most important channel for the infusion of alien ideas into
the administration of justice at the lower levels and at the same
time it acted as a unifying influence. Local court holders came to
know what was expected of them and some of them may sometimes
have imitated what they had seen when acting as witnesses or as-
sessors in the superior courts. 61
As a result customary law became a system of law binding persons
subject to its jurisdiction, but in the process lost its essential char-
acter. We must continually bear in mind that "native law and
custom," as applied in the official courts today is significantly differ-
ent from the pre-European "customary law.
' 62
Even within this framework, significant changes in the content
of customary law have also taken place. In the traditional society a
norm of customary law was determined by its popular acceptance,
following the anthropological definition of a legal norm.63 This was
no longer so when customary law came to be applied by officially
recognized "courts," whose decisions were subject to the review by
the higher courts, which were administering a different kind of law.
This hierarchial aspect of ordering may mean, as one writer has
contended, that a rule of customary law could not "legally exist"
until discovered through judicial inquiry.6 4  More importantly, the
courts were empowered to reject a rule of customary law on various
grounds, and a number of rules of customary law were invalidated in
this way. This being so, has not the source of substantive customary
law itself changed? While such law initially may spring from the
"consensus of the people," its validity and effect in the legal system
depends upon judicial acceptance, and whether a rule will be recog-
nized cannot be known until the matter has come before a superior
court. Therefore, it has been concluded that:
... the term "customary law" today would mean these rules of tra-
ditional customs which are discoverable by judicial inquiry and
which are enforceable because they are acceptable as conforming
61. TWINING, THE PLACE OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN THE NATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF EAST AFRICA 9-10 (1964).
62. Id. at 4.
63. See the discussion of norm-acceptance in HOEBEL, supra note 37, at
14-17.
64. Ogwurkie, The Source and Authority of African Customary Law, 3
U. GHANA L.J. 11, 15 (1966).
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to what ought to be the current values in society. If it is the assent
of the native community that gives a custom its validity, the mere
existence of a customary rule will be enough to give it validity.
But the attitude of the judiciary which picks and chooses between
an enforceable customary rule and the non-enforceable ones seems
to have shifted the emphasis from the consensus of the community
to the opinion of a handful of judges. Can it therefore be rightly
said that customary law as a source of law today is law par excel-
lence in the sense that it is the volksgeist of the people? Has the
judicial attitude not given it a character which is analogous to case-
law and in some ways statute-law? Law must have validity, and
it is the source of validity of law that classifies it as statute law,
case-law or customary law. 65
It is difficult to dispute this conclusion, at least insofar as it demon-
strates that the nature of customary law in the legal system is some-
thing much different from its nature in the traditional society.
Thus far, we have not spoken about changes in customary law
that have occurred in response to changes in patterns of behavior
produced by the advent of colonialism and the exposure to modern
civilization. Such changes have occurred as well. In some parts of
Africa customary law has come to recognize the significance of a
writing in connection with land transfers. 6  With increased mobility,
family ties have been loosened, and the extent of vicarious liability
for the wrongs of family members may be narrowing.6 7 And it has
been recently demonstrated that in Ghana,68 as a result of changing
economic conditions, an individual interest, very much like a freehold,
has been recognized with respect to family or "stool land."69 All of
this points out that the normal evolution of customary law in response
to changing conditions is likewise a factor to be considered.
There is a need then to define the place of the two bodies of law,
received and customary, in the new legal system. Is the pluralistic
order to be retained, or is a merger to take place? More importantly,
how is the substance of the law to be altered to accommodate the
social change which has taken place and which may be expected to
take place as a result of the process of planned development?
B. The Modern Legal System: Unification and Adaptation
It may be assumed that the content of the customary law has
changed in response to the changing conditions of life. This being so,
a strong argument exists for its retention as part of a pluralistic legal
order. Customary law meets the needs of the people, and the im-
position of an entire body of alien rules upon people still living
an essentially traditional way of life could cause social upheaval.
70
65. Id. at 17-18.
66. See ALLOTT, supra note 20, ch. 10.
67. ELIAS, supra note 37, at 282-83.
68. This matter will be discussed in greater detail, infra.
69. Asante, Interests in Land in the Customary Law of Ghana-A New
Appraisal, 74 YALE L.J. 848 (1965).
70. See ELIAS, THE NIGERIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 377 (1963).
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Particularly if the received law has not been adapted to local condi-
tions, there is little utility in compounding the problem further by
imposing it upon the bulk of the people who are not yet "ready" for
it. There are further advantages to having separate local courts
administering the law. The proceedings are inexpensive and expe-
ditious; and despite the changes brought about by formalizing custom-
ary litigation, there still will be some emphasis on conciliation, and
the proceedings are more likely to be acceptable to the people.
71
Where local courts exist, they generally handle a large number of
cases, and their abolition would place a heavy burden upon the
regular courts.
72
However, if customary law is retained as a separate part of the
legal system, this means that the law will be different law for dif-
ferent peoples. For there is no such thing as uniform customary
law. A particular body of customary law operates in a relatively
small area; there may be substantial variation in the law of adjoining
geographical areas and even within a single tribal unit.7 8 We cannot
accurately speak of the customary law of Ghana or of Kenya, but only
of the law of a particular tribe or sub-group.74 If the pluralistic legal
order is to be retained, problems in the "internal conflict of laws"
will be frequent, that is, what customary; law is to be applied to
cases involving persons subject to different systems of customary
law.75 This is intensified by increasing migration and contact be-
tween members of different tribal groups. More importantly, the
existence of different law for different persons impedes the develop-
ment of national unity. 76 Tribalism has been a serious problem in
most African states. Colonial boundaries did not follow tribal lines.
A number of tribes live within a particular state, and some tribes
will be found on both sides of national boundaries.7 7 Many of these
tribes have been traditionally hostile, and the leaders of the nation
must overcome this hostility in order to develop a national conscious-
ness. 78 Separate systems of law based on tribal or geographical
71. See the discussion in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 39, at 14-15.
72. ELIAS, supra note 70, at 377.
73. See Roberts-Wray, The Need for Study of Native Law, 1 J. AFR. L.
82 (1957). However, it may be, as we shall see subsequently, that in a
number of areas the application of different customary laws often will not
produce a different result.
74. The number of such groups may be quite extensive. See TWINING,
supra note 61, at 21.
75. See the discussion in ALLOTT, supra note 20, at 154-55. But cf. TWIN-
ING, supra note 61, at 24-25.
76. See Roberts-Wray, supra note 73, at 86; Cowen, African Legal Stud-
ies-A Survey of the Field and the Role of the United States, 27 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 545, 552 (1962).
77. If customary law is employed in both countries, these tribes will
then have the same law, which may tend to cause them to identify more with
each other than with their own national unit.
78. Practically all African leaders agree that existing boundaries cannot
be changed-to do so would require remaking the map of Africa. See CHARTER
OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, art. III. In extreme form tribal-
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grouping can adversely affect this effort and impede the development
of the needed national consciousness. The modern legal system of a
nation must be national in scope,7 and the applicability of law should
not depend on ethnic criteria, particularly where there is a need to
develop a national consciousness.
It is important to distinguish between the applicability of differ-
ent customary laws to different people and the applicability of some
kind of indigenously-based law (as opposed to the received law) to
people still living the traditional way of life. The matter of a separate
system of customary law is really part of a broader question and is
only one answer to it. That question is the extent to which new and
unfamiliar law is to be imposed upon a people. The imposition of
such law can only be justified if the law is deliberately designed to
change the peoples' way of life, that is, if the law is to be employed to
accelerate social change. But to the extent that the law is to reflect
existing values and needs, an indigenous law, having as its source the
consensus of the people, is obviously more suitable than a received
law, particularly if that received law has not been adapted to local
conditions.
It is not unfair to say that most of the African states have not
fully come to grips with this problem. Almost universally, they
have chosen to retain customary law as a separate part of the legal
system, but at the same time they have limited its operation and
effect.80 Ghana is a good example. Customary law is to be applied
by all courts where it is applicable, and there are also local courts
having limited jurisdiction in cases governed by customary law. The
circumstances of applicability are specifically defined, and they are
limited. The initial presumption favors the application of the com-
mon law, and the burden is on the person seeking the applicability of
customary law to prove this.81 The theory is that all persons are
subject to the common law, but that when a person shows that as a
member of a particular locality he is entitled to the benefit of a local
custom in accordance with the law, he will be given the benefit of that
custom. 82 Professor Harvey has pointed out that customary law
must be viewed in the larger perspective of the relations between the
traditional tribal institutions and the power centers of the new
national state, and that in the new order the center of activity in the
creation and adaptation of norms will be the national legislature.88 He
ism can result in genocide and attempted succession, as witnessed by the
recent events in Nigeria.
79. Or, at least uniform within federated parts of a national state.
80. Ethiopia is the most conspicuous exception, which we will discuss
subsequently. Guinea is also said to have abolished customary law as a sep-
arate part of the legal system. See Pageard, supra note 35, at 479.
81. See the discussion in HARVEY, supra note 26, at 259-63.
82. Ollennu, The Influence of English Law on West Africa, 5 J. AFR.
L. 21, 34 (1961).
83. HARVEY, supra note 26, at 266-67.
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has also observed that since the adoption of a republican form of
government in Ghana, that part of the legal order derived from
indigenous sources has suffered continued attrition in favor of legal
norms received from non-indigenous (English) sources and incor-
porated in a rapidly growing body of national legislation.8 4 In the
French colonies, for the most part, customary law retains the limited
applicability it had during colonial times, but the trend in some
countries is toward the enactment of codes of uniform application
and the abolition of customary law. 5
The crucial issue of law reform, however, cannot be dealt with in
the context of whether the pluralistic legal order is to be retained.
The real problem is not one of determining the extent to which
customary law or received law should apply, but of determining the
extent to which law itself, on the one hand, should accommodate
itself to the social change that has taken place, and on the other hand,
should be employed as a means of accelerating social change. The
matter of a unified or pluralistic legal system does not address itself
to that fundamental question, and, in a sense, is irrelevant to it.
Rational legal planning, then, will not find its expression in the
solution to the question of whether separate regimes of customary
and received law are to be maintained as a part of the new legal sys-
tem. Rather the goal must be to establish a system in which the law
will reflect the social change that has taken place and at the same
time make provision for the acceleration of social change where this
is deemed necessary and feasible. In this connection, there is an
important distinction to be drawn between what may be called "the
general body of law," designed to serve as a basis for conflict resolu-
tion and problem adjustment and the "law of social engineering,"
which is designed to control and alter patterns of behavior in order
to achieve societal objectives.8 6 A certain amount of overlapping of
function will necessarily occur, and the two bodies of law must be
complementary. For example, the law relating to land tenure might
provide for individual ownership in an attempt to change patterns of
land utilization. At the same time the norms of that law will be used
to resolve conflicts over who is entitled to cultivate a given piece of
land. And conflict resolution is related to social engineering, in that
a purpose of conflict resolution is to insure the social stability a
society needs if it is to achieve economic progress. Nonetheless, this
distinction can be drawn in terms of primary function. Subsequently,
we will discuss the "law of social engineering," that is, how the law
can be employed to accelerate social change and promote economic
development. The present discussion will focus on the establishment
84. Id. at 269-70.
85. See the discussion in Sedler, supra note 20, at 593-94.
86. See the discussion of the "law jobs" in LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra
note 26, at 290-93.
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of a body of "general law," which will be suitable for conflict resolu-
tion and the adjustment of the problems of day-to-day living that a
society faces. It is in this context that we will deal with the accom-
modation of law to social change.
As pointed out previously, the new legal system is likely to be
built upon the structure of the old, so that one question to be
answered is how the general body of law will relate to the existing
received and customary law. The methodology of the common law
and of customary law are similar in that both systems lend them-
selves to the accommodation of ongoing social change. For this reason
it is possible to view both the received law and the customary law
as providing the sources for the norms of the new system. The result-
ing body of law will reflect present needs and values; and since it will
possess the methodology common to both the received and customary
law, it can have the necessary flexibility for accommodation. How-
ever, it must be emphasized that this body of law is designed primarily
to serve the function of conflict resolution and problem adjustment.
The areas of activity where behavior patterns may have to be changed
in order to accelerate social change and to attain the objectives of
economic development must be identified and must be dealt with by
a separate body of law designed primarily to serve the function of
social engineering.
This distinction has very significant implications with regard to
the role of customary law as providing norms for the general body of
law in the new system. For when we identify those areas of activity
and behavior which may have to be changed if modernization and
economic development are to take place, we see that these are pre-
cisely the areas where customary law has been most important and
where, under the present ordering, it is to be applied. It is agreed
that customary law has not been very important with respect to
contractual obligations and commercial activity.87 Since customary
law developed in response to the needs of people living in the tra-
ditional society, it would follow that a law relating to contractual
obligations and commercial activity would be of little importance,
as their needs in those areas were minimal. As will be pointed out,
customary criminal law was completely eliminated during the colonial
period, and there is no question of its being reintroduced.8  The real
significance of customary law lies in the areas relating to the life of
the people in the traditional society, namely family relations, land
tenure and succession to family property.8 9 It is these areas where
87. See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 39, at 22; ELIAS, BRITISH COLONIAL LAW
273 (1962). In African societies, as in less developed societies generally,
rights depend upon "status rather than contract."
88. See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 39, at 22.
89. There is general agreement on this point. See PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 39, at 23; Roberts-Wray, supra note 73, at 84-85; ELIAS, supra note 87,
at 274.
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behavior patterns may have to be changed if economic progress and
modernization are to take place. To allow customary law to operate
in these areas will merely reinforce the existing behavior patterns; and,
to the extent that change is desired, these areas must be removed
from its domain. Nor should it be thought that the problems will be
solved in any realistic way by the application of the received law
which was developed to deal with English not African conditions.
The problems must be dealt with directly by a body of law designed
for that purpose.
Once it is realized that the most significant areas in which
customary law has been allowed to operate are the very areas that
will have to be dealt with directly, the most compelling argument in
favor of the pluralistic legal order-that customary law meets the
needs of the people living in the traditional society-disappears. If
these areas are to be taken out of the domain of customary law as
such-and, as we will see, this does not mean that norms of customary
law and consideration of the traditional behavior patterns and values
will not be relevant in determining the content of the law to be
applied-the importance of customary law as a source for the general
body of law is appreciably lessened. And the disadvantages of having
different law for different people, with its adverse effect on efforts to
achieve national unity, are clear. It should be possible to establish a
uniform law applicable to dispute resolution and problem adjustment.
This would mean the end of the pluralistic legal order, with its
separate regimes of received and customary law.
What is needed, then, is the unification of the received law and
the various customary laws into a body of modern law to perform the
functions of dispute resolution and problem adjustment for a society
in the process of development. Professor Allott has postulated three
stages in the unification of the laws of a particular country.90 First
there is harmonization, which is defined as:
the removal of discord, the reconciliation of contradictory elements,
between the rules and effects of two legal systems which continue
in force as self-sufficient bodies of law.
The next stage is integration, defined as:
the making of a new legal system by combining the separate legal
systems into a self-consistent whole. The legal systems thus com-
bined may still retain a life of their own as sources of rules, but
they cease to be self-sufficient autonomous systems.
Finally, there is unification, which is:
the creation of a new, uniform, legal system entirely replacing the
pre-existing legal systems, which no longer exist, either as self-
sufficient systems, or as bodies of rules incorporated in the larger
whole; although the unified law may well draw its rules from any
of the component legal systems which it has replaced.
90. Allott, Toward the Unification of Laws in Africa, 14 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 366, 376-77 (1965).
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During the colonial period in Africa, harmonization had been pretty
well achieved. But the move toward integration and unification of
laws "has been a consequence of independence, of the desire to build a
nation, to guide the different communities with their different laws
to a common destiny." 9' It is this movement which should result in a
uniform system of law, reflecting national needs and objectives.
Although the plural legal order still exists in most of the emerg-
ing nations of sub-Saharan African, the trend is clearly in the direc-
tion of integration and unification. A certain amount of integration
of customary laws takes place by national evolution. With increased
urbanization and contact between people of different tribal groups,
changes in customary practice occur, and this may be reflected in the
customary law of the various groups.9 2 There is evidence that a kind
of urban customary law is developing in some places.9 3 In addition,
affirmative efforts have been taken toward the establishment of
integrated customary law.9 4 The most comprehensive effort has been
that of Tanzania. The aim is to produce a unified version of cus-
tomary law for the whole country by a series of declarations in
codified form covering all the main fields (except land law) in which
customary law is important. Draft declarations of customary laws
are submitted to a panel of experts and then to district councils. The
hope is that these declarations will be applicable in as many areas of
the country as possible. When the approval of the district council
has been obtained, a government notice is published declaring the
unified law as stated in the declaration to be the customary law in
the particular area. This method allows for change in existing law
and for new provisions that previously were not contained in any of
the separate customary laws.95 Ghana has established a mechanism
for the assimilation of customary law rules into the common law, and
a "common law rule of customary law origin" has priority of applica-
tion over rules derived from either the common law or any system of
customary law.96
While these efforts may some day lead to the unification of laws
into a single legal system, it will be a long, drawn-out process. The
present situation in most countries still is that of a pluralistic legal
order consisting of received law (which for the most part has not
91. Id. at 378.
92. See COTRAN, THE PLACE AND FUTURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN AFRICA,
IN EAST AFRICAN LAW TODAY 72, 91 (1966).
93. Allott, supra note 90, at 385.
94. Apart from action by the various governments, there has also been
the work on the Restatement of African Law Project, sponsored by the
School of Oriental and African studies of the University of London.
95. See the discussion in COTRAN, supra note 92, at 82-85; GOWER, INDE-
PENDENT AFRICA 92 (1966). See also the discussion of the work in Kenya in
COTRAN, supra note 92, at 80-81; TWINING, THE PLACE OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN
NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EAST AFRICA 38-41 (1964).
96. The process is described in HARVEY, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
GHANA 252-53 (1966).
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been adapted to local conditions), a certain amount of local legislation
(often based on English statutes), and diverse customary laws. What
is surprising is that while comprehensive efforts have been made to
transform the economy and modernize the country, the same intensity
of directed planning has not gone into the development of a new and
modern legal system. Perhaps this is the fault of lawyers and judges
who have not realized the potentiality of law as an instrument of
social change and the need of law to accommodate itself to such
change. Somehow it is almost as if they see law as removed from the
developmental process. The law-mparticularly the received English
law in which they have been trained-"is there," and it is separate
from whatever else is going on in the country. If this attitude con-
tinues, the lawyer may become an irrelevant figure in the new
society.9T As Professor Gower has put it:
In other words I am not very proud of the legal legacy which
we have bequeathed to our colonies. But it must be admitted that
this view would not be shared by most of the trained lawyers in
those countries whose belief in the perfection of English law sur-
passes that of any Englishman, and who seem able to ignore most
of the complications flowing from the duality of English and cus-
tomary laws.98
The lawyer in these countries must not only be competent to
administer and operate the law as it is now, but must be willing and
equipped to reform it.99
If a unified legal system, combining the best features of the
received law and the diverse customary laws is to be established, it is
clear that this will have to be done by legislation. The judicial
process-with its creation of norms on a case by case basis-does not
contain the mechanism for effecting a revolutionary and compre-
hensive change. Even if the courts were disposed toward assimilating
the different customary laws and the received law into a body of law
adapted to the needs of the particular country-which it appears
they are not' 0 0-they could not do so in any organized and systematic
way, let alone within any reasonable period of time. The new legal
system must be established according to a definite plan, and this is
best accomplished by legislation.
In this process it is possible to make the necessary adaptations of
the received law and to incorporate the best rules of the various
97. His function would be limited to that of representing private clients
in litigation. This appears to be the situation in Ghana, where lawyers as such
do not play a prominent role in public life. HARVEY, supra note 96, at 193-95.
As to the need for the lawyer to play a role in development see generally
Friedman, Role of Law and the Functions of the Lawyer in Developing Coun-
tries, 17 VAND. L. REV. 181 (1963).
98. GOWER, supra note 95, at 30.
99. Id. at 102.
100. The tendency rather is to "Anglicize customary law rather than to
Africanize English law." Id. at 94. See the sharp criticism of the Sudanese
judges in Mustafa, The Treatment of Exemption Clauses by the Sudan Courts,
11 J. AFR. L. 119, 135-36 (1967).
19681
216 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:195
systems of customary law. The legislation would take the form of a
"common law code" like that of California, or the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. It would build on the received common law and would
be interpreted according to common law principles. In other words,
the common law system would be retained as the structure of a new
legal order, which would reflect the unification of received customary
law.
In this connection, some guidance may be obtained from the
adoption of comprehensive codes in Ethiopia. I have described this
process in detail elsewhere 1 ' and will only discuss it by way of
illustration here. Since Ethiopia had not "received" any law from
a colonial power and desired to develop a comprehensive body of
modern law as soon as possible, it was decided to use civilian-type
codes as the basis of the system. It was also decided that there
would be no separate system of customary law. While Ethiopia
never had a separate system of customary law in the sense that it
existed in the colonial states, 102 the complete abolition of customary
law was still a rather revolutionary step for an emerging African
nation to take. 03 It should also be pointed out that many of the pro-
visions of the Ethiopian codes were deliberately designed to change
behavior patterns so that the codes do not only represent the law to be
employed for conflict resolution and problem adjustment but also the
law that was intended to accelerate the needed social change. None-
theless, the Ethiopian codes can serve to illustrate how a unified
legal system is established. From the standpoint of technique, the
following observations may be made. The codes were drafted by
foreign experts 0 4 and then submitted to a codification commission
composed of distinguished Ethiopians representing law, government
and business. Most of the work was done by a smaller body con-
sisting of leading jurists and officials from the Ministry of Justice. A
number of changes were made by this body. Finally, the codes were
debated in Parliament, and some additional changes were made. 0 5
The entire process demonstrates concern for adaptation to the present
and anticipated needs of the country.
In this process careful attention was paid to the traditional way of
life and the effect that the new law would have on this. As pointed
out previously, a number of provisions were designed to alter be-
havior patterns and to accelerate social change. In certain situations,
the inability of the law to serve the latter function and to change
behavior patterns overnight was recognized, and traditional practices
101. Sedler, supra note 20.
102. See the discussion in Sedler, supra note 20, at 595-96.
103. See the discussion in Allott, supra note 90, at 378.
104. Cf. Allott, supra note 90, at 388; GOWER, supra note 95, at 94-95.
105. See the discussion of some of the changes that were made in
Sedler, supra note 20, at 582-83.
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continued to be sanctioned. So too, customary law and practice was
considered as a possible source for the new law, and some provisions
were based on that law. 10 6 There were certain references to custom-
ary law which for the most part either concerned matters of form or
matters to which references to custom are made in other legal sys-
tems.1 07  In only one area-adverse possession to land-could sub-
stantive rights be affected by customary law. 08 The final result was
a uniform body of law, intended to be suitable for the new society in
the process of development. 0 9
The same kind of law reform can be undertaken in the rest of
Africa, and it appears to be taking place in a number of French
African countries such as Senegal.110 To the extent that efforts
have been made to record and codify customary law, that law can
more effectively be considered as a source. The received common
law and English statutes can be evaluated against the needs and
problems of the particular country and truly "applied insofar as local
circumstances permit." The end product will be an amalgam of
common law, legislative, and customary norms within a unified legal
system.
As pointed out previously, the most significant areas of customary
law were those relating to the family, land tenure, succession and the
like, around which life in the traditional society revolved. To the
extent that law is to be employed as a means of accelerating social
change, it is primarily those areas which will be affected. Resistance
to change and the limitations upon law as a means of social control
may best be considered in that context. Such resistance is not as
likely to be encountered with respect to the new body of law of which
we have been speaking thus far, precisely because it does not involve
those sensitive areas. If it is carefully adapted to the needs of the
country and reflects the social change that is taking place, it may
meet with even greater acceptance than the present system, with its
received law based on English needs and values, and its different
106. This is discussed in detail in Krzeczunowicz, A New Legislative Ap-
proach to Customary Law: The "Repeals" Provision of the Ethiopian Civil
Code of 1960, 1 J. ETHIOPIAN STUDIES 57 (1963); The Ethiopian Civil Code:
Its Usefulness, Relation to Custom and Applicability, 7 J. AFR. L. 172 (1963).
107. See the discussion and list of examples in Krzeczunowicz, supra note
106, at 60.
108. Sedler, supra note 20, at 599.
109. There were special problems as regards separate law in family and
property matters for Ethiopia's large Moslem population. The present "solu-
tions" are discussed in Sedler, supra note 20, at 602-05. As to the problems
resulting from the application of the new codes see Sedler, Id. at 605-09.
For a general discussion of the problems faced by the drafter of the Civil Code
and of the theory of reform see David, A Civil Code for Ethiopia: Considera-
tions on the Codification of the Civil Law in African Countries, 37 TUL. L.
REV. 187 (1963). See also Graven, The Penal Code of the Empire of Ethiopia,
1 J. ETHIOPIAN L. 267 (1964); Vanderlinden, Civil and Common Law Influ-
ences on the Developing Law of Ethiopia, 16 BUFF. L. REV. 250 (1966).
110. See Farnsworth, Law Reform in a Developing Country: A New
Code of Obligations for Senegal, 8 J. AFR. L. 6 (1964).
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regimes of customary law.
C. Dispute Settlement: Reform and Return
The abolition of customary law as a separate part of the legal
system will obviate the need for separate customary courts. How-
ever, the abolition of customary law and customary courts as such
provides the opportunity for another kind of law reform. This reform
would in a sense be a "throwback" to the traditional society and
would perpetuate what I think to be one of its great strengths.
Likewise, it would ease the adjustment to the new legal system. The
proposition for which I now am contending is that in the process of
law reform African countries should preserve the advantages of
traditional customary adjudication and dispute resolution, which were
lost when customary law was incorporated as a separate part of the
legal system and customary courts were set up to replace the adminis-
tration of justice by tribal leaders. In traditional litigation the
emphasis was on compromise and conciliation. The "law" was but a
guide to the resolution of disputes. The process was clearly one
oriented toward conflict resolution, and the final decision not only
had to be acceptable to the litigants, but was to reflect the consensus
of the community.
The customary judicial process has been examined in depth by
anthropologists for some time."' One of the most recent studies"
involves the Arusha, an agricultural tribe in Northern Tanzania,
among whom dispute settlement is said to be a "social process." In
this connection, an important distinction is drawn between "law" as
representing binding norms,113 and the real basis for resolution of a
dispute. As the author observes:
Whilst it would be incorrect to say that an agreed settlement of
a dispute never wholly conforms with the relevant, socially accepted
norms, it is true to say that such precise conformity is the excep-
tion. Before I began to understand the general principles of the
Arusha dispute process-but often having already recorded some of
the norms from informants-I was frequently puzzled by the gap
between the details of an agreed settlement and the declared norms.
The norms themselves were invariably quoted during the dispute
discussions, and this confused me further. I noted that the Arusha
themselves were not worried by this gap; indeed they seldom com-
mented on it, although it was sometimes large. After beginning to
appreciate Arusha concentration on compromise, which would pro-
vide a mutually acceptable resolution of a dispute, I was almost
inclined to describe them as cynical opportunists. If by that is
meant "unprincipled," it is a wrong description of the Arusha in
these matters .... They are, then, guided by their principles of
111. Some of the "classical" anthropological studies of African tribes
are SCHAPERA, A HANDBOOK OF TSWANA LAW AND CUSTOM (1938); GLUCK-
MAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA (2d
ed., 1967); BOHANNON, JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT AMONG THE Tiv (1957).
112. GULLIVER, SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AFRICAN SOCIETY (1963).
113. See note 37, supra.
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right behavior, and they use them as the bases of claims to rights;
but they accept an imperfect world in which an individual does not
and should not expect to gain all the ideal rights prescribed by the
approved norms. But equally, men hope to be able to avoid some
of the obligations implicit in those norms. It is perhaps signifi-
cant that the Arusha have no word that can be translated as "jus-
tice," nor does any such concept appear in their ideology. It is an
irrelevant consideration. They are prepared to agree to something
which is as near to their claim as possible in the particular con-
text of the strengths and weaknesses of the two parties to the ne-
gotiations. Further, they believe that undue insistence on one's
"rights" under these norms may well conflict with obtaining an
effective settlement, and with establishing or maintaining other-
wise satisfactory relations .... 114
The Arusha are suspicious of the official "native" courts, considering
them to be alien-imposed institutions." 5 While the "political" nature
of the process" 6 might be troublesome to us, it cannot be doubted
that the process is effective in arriving at a mutually satisfactory
solution.
In some societies the traditional authorities function more like
"judges," but here too the emphasis is on conciliation and reconcilia-
tion. This is reflected in the judgment, which unlike a jury's general
verdict, for example, is not an all or nothing proposition. Rather, as
one commentator has observed:
The judgments take the form of apportioning blame and praise for
particular acts or omissions of the litigants as they unfold their
stories and buttress them by witnesses or other evidence. It is the
one who, on balance, has more points against him that finally gets
mulcted in fine or compensation for the benefit of the other. 11
Restoration of the parties to the status quo ante is the keynote of
the judicial process, and nothing must be left in the possession of
one which legitimately belongs to the other. Even where the final
point is scored by only one party so that fine or compensation is
imposed on the other, the latter goes away at least satisfied by the
open-handed way in which the various aspects of the respective
rights and wrongs have been acknowledged and appraised in the
course of the judgment(s). The verdict, where it goes against him,
does not strike him as the command of an all-powerful judge laying
down an inexorable law which he hardly understands, or which
can hardly be regarded as the expression of the common conscious-
ness of the community. 118
One writer has asked, "in what ways can the best of African values
and techniques to be found in traditional ways of settling disputes be
preserved and incorporated into the official legal system,"" 9 and this
question may profitably be considered by legal planners in Africa
today.
114. GULLIVER, supra note 112, at 241-42.
115. Id. at 268-74.
116. Id. at 299.
117. This is very nicely illustrated in a case that Kroeber recorded among
another primitive people, the Yurok Indians in Northern California. See
HOEBEL, LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 54-55 (1954).
118. ELIAS, THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 270-72 (1956).
119. TWINING, supra note 95, at 14.
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Even in the most developed legal systems the techniques of
conciliation and arbitration have occasioned new interest. In the
United States, for example, a growing number of commercial cases
are being referred to arbitration, and arbitration has been the method
for resolving disputes under collective bargaining agreements for
some time. Of course, what we are talking about here is not arbitra-
tion in this "legal" sense,120 but it also illustrates an alternative to the
adjudicatory and adversary method of dispute resolution, and one
that has worked very well in the traditional African society. It may
be asked whether the people living in the traditional society are
hostile to new law as such, or whether their resistance is directed
toward the alien legal institutions which have been imposed upon
them. Notwithstanding the establishment of "native courts," many
disputes are still settled by the traditional authorities.121 If the
customary courts and a separate system of customary law are to be
eliminated, recourse to the traditional authorities might be expected
to increase.
It is possible to incorporate the traditional process of dispute
settlement into the modern legal system in a number of ways. To the
extent that the disputants have submitted their case to the traditional
authorities and a judgment has been rendered, this should be recog-
nized as a legally binding arbitration and prevent further litigation
of the dispute in the courts.122 There may be objections to this
approach on the ground that it would enhance the power of the
traditional authorities at a time when the central government is
trying to break their power, 123 but it may be asked whether it is not
desirable to give them this kind of "judicial power," and whether
they may not perform a useful function in this regard. Secondly, if
customary courts are to be abolished, some kind of small claims court
may be necessary in order to handle minor disputes. The judges of
these courts-who may or may not be legally qualified-could be
directed to attempt conciliation in the traditional way and to
adjudicate the dispute only if this fails. 24  These courts would be
seen primarily as places for conciliation and would be recognized to
have a different function from the regular courts. Finally, there is
no reason why formal provisions for conciliation could not be incor-
porated into the judicial process. This is done in Japan, which also
has a long tradition of arbitration and conciliation.
125
120. See the discussion of the meaning of "arbitration" in ELIAS, supra
note 118, at 212-15.
121. As Gulliver's research among the Arusha indicates. The same situa-
tion prevails in Ethiopia, and I would imagine in most other places as well.
122. It apparently has this effect in Ethiopia. See the discussion in Sedler,
supra note 2U, at 608.
123. See HARVEY, supra note 96, at 121-22.
124. It may be assumed that their decision could be appealed to a higher
court with trial de novo.
125. See generally KAWASHIMA, LAW IN JAPAN, 41 (Von Mehren, ed.,
1963).
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The traditional process of dispute settlement, with its emphasis
on conciliation and reconciliation, should be regarded as an important
part of the African legal heritage. It was not incorporated into the
legal system by the colonial powers, but, nonetheless, survived as a
part of the "living law" of the people. As a part of the process of law
reform and the establishment of the modern legal system, this indige-
nous institution may be given new life.
With regard to the accommodation of law to social change, then,
the end product of law reform in these nations should be a modern
legal system, unified in nature, and suitable for conflict resolution
and problem adjustment in the new society.
LAW REFORM AND THE ORDERING OF BEHAVIOR: LAW AND THE
ACCELERATION OF SOCIAL CHANGE
A. The Ordering Function of Law
One of the recurrent themes of the history of legal thought has
been the controversy over whether law should follow or lead, whether
it should be a determining agent in the creation of new norms.1 20
There is no doubt that law has been employed to change patterns of
behavior in both democratic and autocratic societies; the difference
between the two may relate primarily to how the decision to effect
social change is made, or, at the most, to the degree of change that is
attempted.127 However, as we have pointed out previously, law has
rarely been employed to effect a complete transformation of the peo-
ples' way of life.' 28 The result of political revolution has generally
been a change in power relationships between competing groups and
in the distribution of wealth between different economic classes. But
a different kind of revolution is taking place in Africa today, the
revolution of development. The stated goals of the ruling elite are to
establish a modern society and economy, and this necessarily involves
a radical change in behavior patterns if the goals are to be reached.
It is the change from a "traditional" way of life to a "modern" one-
with all that these words connote-that is contemplated. For this
reason, the concept of law as a "determining agent in the creation of
new norms" takes on a significance that it has never had before. It
has been pointed out that the law's response to social needs and
changing trends of public opinion is greatly stimulated by national
emergencies. 29 So much of our present law of economic regulation,
126. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 3 (1959).
127. Id. at 9-10.
128. The adoption of the new legal system in Turkey following the Ataturk
revolution might be considered an example of such an attempt. With re-
spect to the Soviet Union, Friedmann concludes that "after more than forty
years of Soviet law, despite many basic differences between the Soviet and
other legal systems, no basically new concepts or legal relationships have
developed." Id. at 9.
129. Id. at 12-13.
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for example, can be traced to the emergency of the great depression.
How much more so is this true in Africa today, where there is what
may be described as a "continuing emergency," the need to establish a
modern society and economy as soon as possible. This "emergency"
may give rise to the need for law to create new norms and change
patterns of behavior in order to serve as an instrument for the accelera-
tion of social change. It is this function of law and its application to
present-day Africa which we shall now consider.
The function of law as a method for social ordering cannot be
separated from the values upon which this social ordering is to be
based. Law itself is a value-neutral technique, and the values in aid
of which the technique may be employed are as variable as human
experience. 130  It has been pointed out that law is superorganic in
that it is not predetermined in specific content by the inherent forms
of the human organism.131 The "law" consists of a specially demarked
set of social norms that are maintained through the application of
"legal sanctions.' 1 32 Every social system rests upon certain "social
postulates" which must be isolated from the law since the law is the
technique for enforcing the norms following from those postulates."33
We may call these postulates "values" and the enforceable, i.e.,
sanctioned, norms "law." The content of the law, then, will be
determined by the values of which it is an implementing technique.
What is the source of these values? In a democratic society it is
assumed that the values which the law implements are those of the
majority of the people, or at least of a cohesive minority that has
been able to obtain the acceptance of its values by the majority.
3 4
It is in this sense that we speak of societal values. However, a
democratic and developed society, as we know it, assumes theoretical
equality between all persons and groups. This assumption is simply
not valid in the emerging nations of sub-Saharan Africa today. There
is a small elite which controls the reins of political power and
which is oriented toward the values of modernization and economic
development. The great mass of the people are illiterate, exist at a
subsistence level, and are oriented toward the values of the tradi-
tional way of life. In such a case, it is possible, as Professor Harvey
has demonstrated, "for the law to draw its value content from the
acceptances of an elite group that has succeeded in monopolizing the
function of manipulating the technique and is using it to achieve
social change."' 135  This is the situation which prevails in these na-
130. HARVEY, supra note 96, at 344-45.
131. HOEBEL, supra note 117, at 9.
132. Sanction seems indispensable to a definition of law. HOEBEL, supra
note 117, at 28; HARVEY, supra note 96, at 344. See also HALL, COMPARATIVE
LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY 56-57 (1963).
133. See the discussion in HOEBEL, supra note 117, at 13-17.
134. See the discussion in FRIEDMANN, supra note 126, at 10-11.
135. HARVEY, supra note 96, at 346.
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tions. Admittedly there are serious implications for the concept of
liberty as we understand it,138 and it can be cogently argued that it is
"undemocratic" for the elite to impose its values on the majority of
the people before the people are "ready" for such change. A dis-
cussion of this question, however fundamental, is beyond the scope of
the present writing. It must be accepted as "given" that the values
which will be implemented by law are those of the governing elite,
whose values are those relating to modernization and economic de-
velopment. Our purpose here is to analyze the method by which
these values can be reflected in legal norms designed to alter patterns
of behavior based on traditional values, thereby accelerating social
change. It should be noted, however, that the value assumptions
on which the new law will be based involve a change from the
values (and interests) of a foreign elite, i.e., the colonial power, to
those of an indigenous elite who (it can be assumed) wish to change
the society for the betterment of all the people.
13 7
The question of the extent to which law may be used to order
behavior arises most clearly in the areas of criminal and family law,
since the criminal law involves the proscription of individual be-
havior considered to be "anti-social" and family law involves the
regulation of interpersonal relations. It is interesting to contrast the
treatment of these two areas of law during the colonial period. The
first type of English law systematically introduced in most African
territories was the criminal law, which covered all serious crimes,
although customary courts had jurisdiction to apply the customary
law to minor offenses. This enabled the colonial authorities to control
the "monopoly of force" and to define the nature of "anti-social"
conduct. 3 8 Family relations, on the other hand, were largely the
domain of customary law, since the maintenance of the traditional
family system was in no way inconsistent with the colonial objectives.
Indeed, it may have satisfied those objectives very nicely, since it
kept the family subject to the control of the traditional authorities
through whom the British were administering their policy of indirect
rule. For the independent nation, of course, both areas will be very
important, and needless to say, the objectives of the independent
nation will be quite different from those of the colonial power.
136. See the discussion of the conflict between "liberty and security"
as applied to contemporary Africa in Cowen, supra note 76, at 563-64. The
same considerations are applicable to the conflict between "liberty and
progress."
137. This is not to say that they may not benefit as well. Nonetheless,
they are now "relatively privileged," and these privileges could be jeopar-
dized by modernization.
138. See the discussions in TWINING, supra note 95, at 14; Seidman, Law
and Economic Development in Independent, English-Speaking Sub-Saharan
Africa, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 999, 1010-12.
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B. The Criminal Law
There is no doubt that the structure of modern criminal law will
follow the existing model and that a criminal code of universal
application will govern, except possibly for very minor offenses.
13 9
The independent government is no less desirous of retaining the
monopoly of force and defining the nature of anti-social conduct
than was its colonial predecessor. The significant questions concern
the content of that law, how it will be adapted to African conditions,
and most importantly, how it will be used as a technique for social
ordering. The importance of criminal law in any society is obvious,
since it must provide the minimal security and order necessary for the
society to operate. Such security and order are particularly necessary
in Africa if development and modernization are to proceed. 140 More-
over, as we will see, the matter of establishing an effective body of
criminal law in Africa is much more complex than elsewhere.
Since the criminal law represented most starkly the imposition of
force by the colonial power, it is not surprising that a criminal con-
viction in a government court did not carry with it any social stigma.
Professor Gower has described this situation very well:
Colonialism, like enemy occupation, tends to instill a contempt
for the law and for the moral standards which it expresses. The
government is an alien one; to cheat it is a patriotic duty. The
law is that of the colonial oppressor; it has no moral sanction and
punishment for breaking it has no normal or social stigma. The
political future of a nationalist in Ghana depended upon acquiring
the degree of P.G. (Prison Graduate), and one leader who failed
to achieve this distinction, but kept the pot boiling while his col-
leagues were incarcerated, had to be rewarded with an honorary
P.G. degree. This belief is that a conviction is an honour rather
than a disgrace is not restricted to political offences. Some, who
afterwards attained the highest positions in newly independent Af-
rican states, had been convicted of crimes of dishonesty of which
their fellow Africans were the victims. No one (apart from their
immediate victims) thought much the worse of them on that ac-
count.141
Moreover, the concept of incarceration did not exist in the traditional
society. Punishment was not separated from reparation for the
139. See generally Read, Criminal Law in the Africa of Today and To-
morrow, 7 J. AFR. L. 5 (1963). And see COTRAN, THE PLACE AND FUTURE OF
CUSTOMARY LAW, IN EAST AFRICAN LAW TODAY 72, 79-81 (1966). It should
be pointed out, however, that where customary courts exist, they try a large
number of the total criminal cases, since most cases involve "minor offenses."
In Northern Nigeria much of the general criminal law is administered by
customary courts and under a different penal code. See Anderson, The
Northern Nigerian Codes: A Major Advance, 24 MODERN L. REv. 616, 617
(1961); Williams, Legal Development in Nigeria, 1957-1967; A Practicing
Lawyer's View, 11 J. AFR. L. 77, 78-79 (1967).
140. See the discussion of "legality" and its relationship to development
in Seidman, supra note 138, at 1062-68. It is significant that in Ethiopia the
first new code to be promulgated was a penal code and that a penal code had
already been enacted as far back as 1930.
141. GOWER, supra note 95, at 33.
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victim14 2-the failure to provide for reparation as part of a judgment
of conviction is still mystifying to Africans143-and usually took the
form of an order requiring the defendant or his family to make
specific reparation or to pay a "fine" to the victim. In extreme cases,
the defendant would be executed or banished. The imposition of
imprisonment by the colonial power would not be considered "shame-
ful" and was perhaps treated as an "experience" at the expense
of the colonial power. The significance of incarceration with its
supposed social stigma is thereby Weakened for the African.
This mentality does not change overnight simply because the
nation has now achieved independence. It will take some time "for
the idea to seep through that the government is now 'ours' not
'theirs,' and that the laws are of 'our' making and ought morally to be
obeyed. '144 In terms of cultural identification between "the gover-
nors and the governed," the new government may be no less alien to
the mass of the people notwithstanding that the "governors" are
African. It is this attitude toward the commission of "crime" that
creates very serious problems, since the definition of what is anti-
social, as reflected in the criminal law, may not comport with the
peoples' idea of what is morally wrong. As we know so well from our
own experience, to make something "criminal" does not necessarily
make it morally reprehensible. This problem is magnified in Africa,
because this attitude may exist with respect to much of the conduct
proscribed by the criminal law.
This is particularly true as regards crimes against property. In
the traditional society theft was a very serious offense, and was
severely punished.1 45 If the theft were committed against a family
member, family cohesion was threatened. Thefts against others
would lead to retaliation and family feuding. For these reasons
theft was the kind of crime that seriously threatened the social order,
and social and moral stigma was attached. But theft against an
outsider was something else again. Certainly no moral stigma could
result from stealing from a "foreigner," and once people were outside
of their traditional group theft became acceptable. This attitude
has persisted, and, of course, the extreme poverty of most of the
people not only provides the impetus for such crime but brings moral
approval. Throughout Africa theft has been on the rise, particularly
142. See the discussion of the forms and theory of punishment in ELIAS,
THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 260-63 (1956).
143. See the discussion in GOWER, supra note 95, at 29-30. See also
Brown, The Award of Compensation in Criminal Cases in East Africa, 10 J.
AFR. L. 33, 37-39 (1966).
144. GOWER, supra note 95, at 34.
145. "While almost every other offense is attributed to circumstances
rather than to character, that of theft signifies to the natives an unpardonable
nature." Dundas, Native Laws of Some Bantu Tribes of East Africa, 51 J.
ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL Soc. 217 (1921), quoted in ELIAS, supra note 142,
at 141.
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in urban areas where tribal and family loyalties are not present.
In fact, there is evidence that a class of "professional thieves" has
arisen, plying their trade in the urban areas. This same kind of
attitude is reflected in the widespread corruption by public servants,
involving not only bribe-taking on a wide scale, but also embezzle-
ment of public funds.
46
Not only could the high incidence of such crime, particularly
corruption, have serious implications for economic development, 47
but the mentality itself-in which all persons are seen as potential
victims-threatens the social order. There is a need to "create a
sense of solidarity with all men composing society,"'148 by combating
this attitude. The goal is to end the suspicion and mistrust that a
constant fear of theft must produce. The social significance of the
increase in crimes against property cannot be ignored.
There are also a number of serious problems regarding crimes
against the person. These societies are undergoing a rapid rate of
cultural change, which creates serious tensions and considerably
affects the incidence of mental illness.1 49 This, in turn, may produce
an increase in the rate of homicide and other crimes against the
person. Very little research has been done into the mental health
problems of African countries; and, of course, psychiatric facilities
(and psychiatrists) are woefully lacking. 50 The difficulties that con-
front the courts in determining criminal responsibility are legion, and
are compounded by the absence of psychiatric experts. Most courts,
therefore, have held that the defense of insanity can be established
without expert testimony.151 This is illustrative of the compromises
that have to be made in the administration of the criminal law because
of African conditions.
More significantly, there is the question of what is to be done
with the criminally irresponsible defendant, since psychiatric facilities
are so lacking. As a practical matter, the defense of insanity only
serves to prevent the defendant's execution (the death penalty is
regularly imposed for homicide throughout Africa); if he is found
criminally irresponsible, he will still have to be confined and is not
likely to receive very much in the way of therapeutic treatment. 152
There is little probability that the person found to be criminally
irresponsible will ever be able to be restored to society.
146. See the discussion in Read, Minimum Sentences in Tanzania, 9 J. ArR.
L 20, 24-25 (1965); Seidman, supra note 138, at 1065-67.
147. See KAMARCK, THE ECONOMICS OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT 244-45
(1967). The author points out, however, that the corruption is more of a hin-
drance than a serious threat.
148. SEKOU TOURE, TOWARD FULL RE-AFRiCANIZATION 46 (1959).
149. See KAMARCK, supra note 147, at 242; Milner, supra note 18, at
1139-40.
150. See generally Milner, supra note 18, at 1134-38, 1140-41.
151. Id. at 1157.
152. Id. at 1140-42, 1165.
LAW REFORM IN AFRICA
The most crucial problem area is that of determining what con-
duct should be brought within the criminal processes and how those
processes are to be applied. The existing criminal codes are based on
English law, and for the most part, English standards of "reason-
ableness" and criminal responsibility. 1 53 As one writer has observed,
"any resemblance between the mores imminent in the codes and
those of the people subject to them would seem largely accidental,
like the broken clock that is right twice a day." Perhaps this is a
little extreme, but the fact remains that the norms of existing crim-
inal law are based on scientific premises while the world view of
Africans living in the traditional society can only be characterized
as pre-scientific. The African may commit acts which are logical
within the framework of his understanding of natural processes, but
which the criminal law, embodying a totally different sort of under-
standing, treats as criminal.
5 4
Perhaps the clearest example of this conflict is the matter of
"witch murder." We confidently say today that witches do not
exist, although not too long ago, as history goes, we were not quite so
sure. But we are sure now, and homicide is homicide, even though
the accused may have believed that what he was killing was not a hu-
man being, but a witch. 1 5 For many Africans, however, belief in
witchcraft is an integral part of their world view, growing out of native
theories about the psyche. Professor Seidman has described the
"fearful dilemma" facing an African so believing, and how the courts
have responded to it:
The Akan (one of the largest West African tribal groupings), for
example, postulate man as tripartite. His physical body, a mere
shell, encloses two indwelling souls, the kra, or life-soul and sun-
sum, or personality-soul. A wicked entity, the obayi, on occasion
seizes dominion of the sunsum of a witch. Without her volition,
her sunsum makes excursions from her earthly body. Free of phy-
sical restraint, it attacks the kra or sunsum of its victim by sucking
it forth secretly from its material shell. As the kra is devoured,
sometimes by degrees, sometimes in a rush, so the physical body of
the victim withers. As the sunsum is destroyed, so will the victim's
hope of worldly success disappear.
The African who believes in witchcraft is thus faced by a fear-
ful dilemma. He believes in witches to his bones. He knows that
they can destroy his kra or sunsum in sundry mysterious ways,
without chance for defense, so that both his physical being and his
hope for earthly success are endangered, as much by threatened
blow of panga or spear or matchet. He sees nothing in the societal
order to which he can appeal for protection. His tradition approves
of capital punishment for witches.
153. See generally id. at 1147-53; Seidman, Witch Murder and Mens
Rea: A Problem of Society Under Radical Social Change, 28 MODERN L.
REv. 46, 55-58 (1965).
154. Seidman, Mens Rea and the Reasonable African: The Pre-Scientific
World-View and Mistake of Fact, 15 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1135, 1137 (1966).
155. See Regina v. Machekequonabe, 28 Ont. 309 (1897).
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Faced by such dread forces, bereft of societal shield, terrified
by the loss of the values at stake, some Africans not surprisingly
have struck back in terror and in self-defense. How have the
common law judges treated them when they were charged with
murder?
The response of the courts has been practically unvarying:
such defendants are guilty of murder. 156 But the verdict, with its
concomitant death sentence, is in both West and East Africa almost
invariably leavened with a judicial prayer that the executive re-
verse the decision just made. Such a formalized, indeed institution-
alized reliance upon executive clemency at once negates any sup-
posed deterrent effect of the death penalty and confesses a felt in-
adequacy for the judicial solutions to the problems posed by these
cases.
157
It is these kind of problems that squarely pose the question of how law
can be employed as a means of social control.
6 8
To simply apply the received criminal law, which has been de-
veloped in response to English needs and values, including a belief
in scientific rationality, will not furnish sound solutions to these
problems. The matter must be approached from the perspective of
eliminating conduct that is now considered anti-social, because it
runs counter to the norms and values of the new society that is in the
process of creation, but which may not have been considered anti-
social in the traditional society, a society in the pre-scientific stage.
Likewise, attention must be paid to the method of dealing with the
persons who have engaged in such conduct, both from the standpoint
of eliminating that conduct and from the standpoint of restoring the
offender to society. Reform of the criminal law to achieve these
objectives is a matter of urgent priority.
How, then, can the technique of law, in this context that part of
it denominated as the criminal law, be employed to change existing
behavior patterns? When this question is applied to the emerging
nations of sub-Saharan Africa, it is clear that the suitability of
punitive sanction as a method of effecting change will have to be
considered most seriously. For rehabilitative facilities are simply
lacking, and they will not be given high priority in future planning.
There is a pressing need to change behavior patterns as soon as
possible, and for want of any better method, great reliance may have
to be placed upon punitive sanctions. Since it may be anticipated that
the foundation of the criminal law in these countries will be the
punishment of offenders as a means of deterrence, 159 a field labora-
tory to test the soundness of the deterrence theory of criminal law
will now exist.
156. Among the defenses that have been attempted are lack of mens rea,
self defense or defense of others, mistake, insanity and provocation. Seidman,
supra note 153, at 48.
157. Id. at 46-48.
158. For a discussion of other problem areas see Seidman, supra note 154.
159. See the discussion of the deterrence concept as the basis of the
Ethiopian Penal Code in Graven, The Penal Code of the Empire of Ethiopia,
1 J. ETHOPIAN L. 267, 288 (1964).
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This deterrence is likely to prove more effective in regard to
crimes against property, where there is greater opportunity for
conscious choice, than in regard to crimes against the person, often
the result of emotional or mental disorder or pre-scientific belief.
The question is whether severe and certain punishment for crimes
against property will prove to be an effective deterrent, that is,
whether the legal sanction can alter the behavior patterns. The
goal is not necessarily to alter the value-that there is nothing
morally wrong about stealing from a stranger or foreigner-but to
change the behavior pattern by imposing a severe sanction for acting
upon the value.
Such an effort has been made in Tanzania, for example, by the
enactment of the Minimum Sentences Act of 1963, which provides a
minimum prison sentence and corporal punishment for offenses
against property such as theft, robbery, cattle stealing and the like. 1
60
Depending on the offense, the minimum sentence may range from
six months to three years, but the corporal punishment is the same,
twelve strokes of the lash at the commencement of the imprisonment
and twelve additional strokes on the day before the prisoner's release.
Such an approach "stands squarely as a distinct and marked change
in penal policy, representing a clear dissent by an independent nation
from the policies of the former colonial power."'161 Ethiopia has
also introduced corporal punishment for offenses against property,'
1 62
and other nations may be following suit. Another method of deter-
rence, at least in cases where the defendant has something of his own,
might be to adopt the customary practice whereby the thief was not
only required to make compensation to the victim,' 63 but to surrender
some of his own property as "punishment."' 64  The "pinch of the
pocketbook" may prove to be as effective as the "sting of the lash."
In any event, it is clear that the problem of theft and other crimes
against property must be faced. An existing pattern of behavior-if
not the underlying values giving rise to it-must be altered, and
the law, through the imposition of severe sanctions for engaging in
such conduct, may be able to reduce its incidence. In this situation a
clear test of whether the criminal law can effectively be employed as
a means of social control will be made.
Dealing with the problem of crimes against the person is much
more complicated, for here the fact that many Africans are still living
in the pre-scientific society looms large. The situation is further
aggravated by the absence of psychiatric and rehabilitative facilities.
160. Read, supra note 146.
161. Id. at 24.
162. This provision was added when the Code was being considered by
Parliament. See the discussion in Sedler, supra note 20, at 580-81.
163. Provisions for the award of compensation to the victim are provided
in the Tanzanian Act.
164. See ELIAS, supra note 118, at 140-41.
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Rechannelling of behavior patterns is necessary, but it will not be
accomplished by merely stepping up the sanction-in the case of
homicide, the ultimate sanction is now employed (along with a
restrictive standard of criminal responsibility). To put it bluntly
how do you stop people from killing witches? And what do you do
with someone who has killed another, sincerely believing that the
victim was a witch? Even if punishment would have a deterrent
effect on others, which may be questionable, this "utilitarian" solution
conflicts with the humanitarian value that a particular individual
should not be punished when he cannot fairly be held responsible.
165
The original solution, to find the person guilty, but to imprison him
after commutation by executive clemency, may have been an attempt
at compromise in light of practical conditions.'6 6 Perhaps the same
solution could now be institutionalized, as suggested by Professor
Seidman.167 The "guilty verdict" would merely mean that the
accused would be "subject to the administrative process of re-educa-
tion." While the absence of rehabilitative facilities presents difficul-
ties, some efforts could be undertaken. More importantly, the "witch-
killer" would be identified, and the necessity for the maintenance of
social order would require his removal from society. Only after he
was considered "re-educated," if ever, would he be returned. This
would have the necessary deterrent effect on those persons "deter-
rable," and at the same time would not conflict with humanitarian
values. By the same token, efforts are now being made to eliminate
the other behavior pattern giving rise to the problem, by acting on the
"witch." There has been widespread enactment of anti-witchcraft
legislation, with almost absolute liability and severe penalties. 168
Again, the threat of sanction must be relied upon to deter those
persons who "play at witchcraft" and deliberately take advantage of
the superstitions of others living in the traditional society. 6 9 In
other words, the law must deal with the problem of witch murder
directly and attempt to find some solution by the imposition of sanc-
tions designed to change behavioral patterns. The problem will not
be solved in any rational way by the application of doctrines and
concepts from the received English law.
Our discussion of the problems of theft and witch murder illus-
trate the kind of reform of criminal law that must take place. 70 It is
165. Seidman, supra note 153, at 57.
166. Id. at 58.
167. Id. at 60. See also his discussion, supra note 154, at 1160-64.
168. Seidman, supra note 154, at 1154.
169. But again, this must take account of those "witches" who are not
acting "deliberately." See the discussion in Seidman, supra note 154, at
1155-56.
170. There are a number of problems in the area of criminal procedure
as well, perhaps the most significant of which is the need to distinguish
between the function of the state and that of the private prosecutor. The
Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code contains a number of provisions designed
to reconcile these interests. See the discussion in Sedler, supra note 20, at
624-25.
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in this area that the use of law as a technique for social ordering will
be most crucial. The criminal law will have to be employed to
change patterns of behavior that are detrimental to social stability
and the objectives of the modern society. The result should be a new
body of criminal law designed to deal with the problems of be-
havioral control that exist in a society undergoing radical social
change.
C. Law and the Family
Equally significant issues are presented in the area of the law
applicable to family relations. The fundamental question is whether
the law will be employed in an effort to change existing patterns of
family life, if such patterns are found to be detrimental to the
objectives of the modern society. Family life in the traditional society
revolves not only around the nuclear family, that is, husband, wife
and children, but perhaps more importantly around what is called the
extended family. When we talk about the "family" in the traditional
society, we are talking about a social institution consisting of persons
who are descended from a common ancestor and who owe allegiance
to that institution.171 The family in this sense is a legal institution;
as we will see in the next section, property may be owned by the
family rather than by the individual members. More significant
is the operation of the family as a social institution. Not only is
allegiance owed to the institution as such, but inter-personal relations
and obligations exist between all members. One's family responsi-
bilities have a much broader connotation in traditional African
society, as any educated and prosperous African will be quick to
point out. This was reflected in the customary law, where the
family was held responsible for certain actions committed by one of
its members, but the social obligations of the family to its members
(and of one member to another) are far in excess of the legal require-
ments. 172 It is this institution, having legal and social significance,
with which "family law" must be concerned.
Naturally enough, a very comprehensive body of customary law
developed with respect to the family,'17 3 and customary family law,
in turn, becomes an integral part of the traditional society. The
extended family system was fully consistent with the objectives of
the colonial power, and customary law was allowed to operate in
this domain.
The colonial powers also introduced their own law of marriage,
and in those countries where there was a large Moslem population,
171. OBI, MODERN FAMILY LAW IN SOUTHERN NIGERIA 10 (1966).
172. Id. at 17.
173. This is, in essence, a law relating to status. ELIAS, supra note 142,
ch. 6.
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marriage could also be contracted under Islamic law.174 The essential
difference between "ordinance" and customary (also Islamic in this
regard) marriage was that ordinance marriage was monogamous
while customary marriage was polygamous. The vast majority of
marriages were and still are contracted under customary law.175 The
legal situation, recognizing ordinance, customary and religious mar-
riage was retained in practically all countries after independence.
Thus, there are two and sometimes three separate systems of law to
govern marriage, divorce, custody, succession and the like.176
When we are talking about customary law, we must remember
that we are talking about the law of a particular ethnic or tribal
group. These laws may differ in certain respects, and there also may
be variation from area to area and even from village to village, 177
which will give rise to problems of "internal conflict of laws." How-
ever, it has been contended that often the results of the application of
different customary laws are "surprisingly similar as between the
different ethnic groups.' 178 If this is so, and only empirical investi-
gation can tell, it has important implications as regards the imposition
of a uniform family law. At present, however, for the vast majority
of Africans the family law is that of the particular tribe or ethnic
group.
The most important feature of the nuclear family is that it is
polygamous. During the colonial period, no effort was made to end
the practice, and the courts upheld the validity of polygamous
marriage. 79 In fact, there was very little interference generally
with the operation of customary family law. 80 Africans who marry
under the ordinance may not legally take a second wife, but in
practice this often occurs.' 8 ' Interesting questions also arise as to
whether the entry into an ordinance marriage means that all aspects
of family life are to be governed by English law. 8 2 Many problems
are created by the plurality of marriage laws, both as regards con-
flicts between the received law and customary law and between the
174. See generally ALLOTT, ESSAYS IN AFRICAN LAW, ch. 8.
175. TWINING, THE PLACE OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN THE NATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF EAST AFRICA 19 (1964); KASUNMU & SALACUSE, NIGERIAN FAM-
ILY LAW 16 (1966).
176. In the Sudan the received English law is inapplicable in family mat-
ters. Where the parties are Moslem, the matter is governed by Islamic law;
if they are not, customary law applies (subject to the repugnancy and incon-
sistency provisions). See generally FARRAN, MATRIMONIAL LAWS OF THE
SUDAN 14-18 (1963).
177. KASUNMU & SALACUSE, supra note 175, at 24-26.
178. OBI, supra note 171, at 4.
179. KASUNMU & SALACUSE, supra note 175, at 17-18.
180. Id. at 18-19. As the Privy Council has observed:
"The principles of natural justice, equity and good conscience applicable
in a country where polygamy is generally accepted should not be readily
equated with those applicable to a community governed by the rule of mon-
ogamy." Dawodu v. Danmole, [1962] 1 W.L.R. 1053, 1060.
181. TWINING, supra note 175, at 19.
182. See the discussion in ALLOTT, supra note 174, at 218-20.
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different systems of customary law. This, in itself, would indicate
the need for some reform in the present approach. But more
important is the question of how the law will deal with the institu-
tion of the family as the nation moves toward modernization and
rapid economic development.
The social change that is going on cannot help but affect the
existing institution. As migration to urban areas take place, family
ties are loosened, and emancipated members may seek to sever the
family relationship. 8 3 The crucial issue is how the law should relate
to the extended family when this change is occurring. A further
question is whether uniform family law is possible or desirable. We
may start off by considering some of the problems presented by the
existence of the present family structure, by which we mean the
extended family system, polygamous marriage, and the customary
patterns of relationship between spouses and between family mem-
bers. What are the implications of the present family structure (and
the law governing it) for modernization and economic development?
As we will see in the next section, the present system of land
tenure is bound up with family ownership of land. A change in the
existing family structure might cause a change in patterns of land
holding. However, the matter of land tenure will have to be dealt
with directly, and even if that is changed, the family structure will
not necessarily change in turn. For this reason, it is possible to
consider the family structure without regard to traditional land
tenure, although the relationship between the two should always be
kept in mind.
We may now concern ourselves with the institution of the family
as it relates to modernization and social change. Let us first consider
the extended family. An analysis of its role and functions reveals a
mixed picture, since in some respects it hinders economic develop-
ment and modernization, while in other respects it could assist it.
With regard to economic development, one author has observed:
Unfortunately, in terms of potential economic development, the
extended family system has many drawbacks: it tends to dis-
courage individual enterprise and initiative, as the burden of family
obligations rises with the degree of an individual's success. A big
man in the family is expected to be generous in helping others with
school fees, doctors' bills, "brideprice," financing weddings and fu-
nerals and hospitality to all relatives. Consciously or uncon-
sciously, the knowledge that a greater income will mean corre-
spondingly greater burdens must inhibit the efforts an individual
puts forth.'
84
There are other drawbacks: family crises tend to prevent ac-
cumulation of, or to drain away, any capital that may have been
accumulated. Not only are savings in general held down, but the
proliferation of small entrepreneurs is prevented. Because people
183. See the discussion in OBI, supra note 171, at 36-40.
184. For an interesting description of "supporting two families," one
modern and one traditional, see TURNBULL, THE LONELY AFRICAN 31-34 (1962).
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with small incomes find it hard to comprehend the greater costs of
living of individuals with higher incomes, a successful civil servant
or company employee may be unable to withstand the pressure on
him to contribute to other members of the family and still live in
the style that he and his family believe is socially necessary. Hence,
the temptation to accept bribes or to "borrow" from public or
company funds may become great....
One of the problems of small business everywhere is the diffi-
culty the small businessman has in comprehending the differences
between "income" on the one hand, and amortization and replenish-
ment of capital on the other. If he is under pressure to give help to
meet some family crisis, convincing other members of the family
that the cash he has in the till is not "income" may be almost im-
possible. This is, in fact, one of the main causes of the failure of
some of the programs to provide loans to small businesses in Af-
rica. 8 5
The above discussion demonstrates most clearly how the matter of
family structure and values inherent in that structure cannot be
separated from economic development and modernization.
On the other hand, as the same author points out,8 6 the extended
family system provides certain economic advantages. Small contri-
butions from many family members may be pooled to finance the
education of a bright child. The family can and does serve as a
mutual aid society, although as has been pointed out, this is to the
detriment of the more prosperous members. Still, the need to provide
for one's extended family could in some cases spur the particular
individual to more productive effort. A very important advantage
of the extended family is that the family's assets could serve as
security for small loans given to individual members, and the family
can pool its credit to borrow money. The author's conclusion is that:
On balance, the extended-family system in Africa so far has
probably inhibited economic development more than it has helped,
but there is a considerable potential for the good-for example, if
the extended family were guided more in the direction of acting as
a kind of mutual-investment fund or trust .... If the family sys-
tem became an effective way to collect small savings and use them
to finance the enterprises of its most capable business members, it
could become one of the most potent engines of economic develop-
ment in Africa.'
8 7
On the other hand, the extended family system as a social insti-
tution in present-day Africa has a great deal of utility. The re-
sources of these countries to provide social welfare services are quite
limited, so that priority of services becomes a most important con-
sideration in the development of social welfare programs. 8 8  Where
a mechanism exists in the society for dealing with certain problems,
it may be unnecessary to provide social welfare services in those
areas, and in African societies the extended family system may pro-
185. KAMARCK, supra note 147, at 50-51.
186. Id. at 52-53.
187. Id.
188. Rozanne Sedler, Social Welfare in a Developing Country: The Ethio-
pian Experience, 11 J. INT. SOCIAL WORK 1 (1968).
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vide for needs that in a more developed society-where ties to the ex-
tended family have been substantially lessened-would come within
the ambit of organized social welfare services.18 9 For example, where
the extended family assumes responsibility for child rearing, it is
not necessary for the government or the organized community to
provide for abandoned or neglected children. 190 In other areas, the
family may provide assistance in implementing social welfare pro-
grams.' 9 ' Clearly, the institution of the extended family performs
useful societal functions, which if it did not exist, would have to be
met by other means.
Obviously, there is no question of employing the law in an
attempt to abolish the extended family system. Clearly, this is not
within the law's purview, since the law cannot act upon the values
and attitudes that people have with respect to family relations. How-
ever, it is very relevant to consider whether these attitudes and
values will be reflected in legal norms giving the institution power
over its members. The law must define the legal relationship be-
tween the extended family and the individual member, particularly in
light of the social change that is taking place as a result of moderniza-
tion. If the extended family is to continue to perform its useful
social functions and is to realize its potential for assistance to its
members, what legal authority it is to have with respect to the
individual? To what extent is it to be permitted to exercise control
over his behavior? Can it require him to make economic contribu-
tions to the family? Insofar as the family as an entity owns property,
what are the rights of the individual with respect to that property? 192
Does an individual have legal rights to assistance, and by the same
token, can the family compel an individual to render assistance to
other family members? Can an individual be expelled from family
membership? It is these kinds of questions with which the law must
be concerned. Here, we are talking about the use of the law to compel
individuals to conform to behavior patterns called for by the values of
the extended family system.
For the most part the legal powers of the family over individual
members have been eroded. In southern Nigeria, for example, the
family head can no longer represent the members in legal proceedings
or compel them to submit disputes to him. The powers of the family
head and family council largely center around the management and
189. Id. at 6-7.
190. Id. at 7.
191. Id. at 8-9. The author uses the example of marriage counseling.
She concludes that the existing societal mechanism is not fully adequate in
Ethiopia, but that with assistance from trained social workers, the traditional
authorities could improve the service they are now rendering.
192. This question cannot be separated from the broader one of whether
the present system of land tenure should be retained, which will be discussed
in the next section.
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allocation of family property. 198 The same kind of change has
occurred elsewhere.0 4 There is no reason for the law to attempt to
arrest the growing tendency of individuals to emancipate themselves
from the control of the extended family. In other words, the law
should leave the extended family system alone, to evolve in response
to changing conditions. Insofar as broader loyalties, such as to the
nation, are envisioned, no effort should be made to encourage more
restrictive ones. Here the value of individuality becomes important,
and it is not likely that the law will be employed to increase the
power of the extended family over its members. But, by the same
token, insofar as the individual desires to remain a member of the
extended family, this value should also be protected.195 The real
question today concerns the power of the extended family over family
property, and this will be discussed in the next section.196 But as
regards the power to control individual members, this power has
been eroded, and it would not be sound nor consistent with the
values of the modern society to attempt to reinstate it.
The most significant area of family law today then, will be that
governing relationships within the nuclear family. Here the law
must deal with marriage and divorce, relations between spouses, and
rights and duties with respect to children. An important question
will be whether unified law is possible in this field. If there is not a
great dissimilarity between different customary systems, it should
be possible to fashion such a law, and within the context of the new
and uniform law to make any reforms considered necessary to change
existing behavior patterns. 97 However, it must be remembered
that here we are dealing with an area of law affecting interpersonal
relations, and one that may be grounded in tradition and religion.
For this reason the present "permissive policy" of leaving such matters
to customary law unless the parties have contracted an ordinance
marriage and evidence the intention to abandon the traditional way
of life, 198 is understandable. Nonetheless, this vital area, with its
193. OBI, supra note 171, at 27-30.
194. See the interesting discussion of the individual and group in ELIAS,
THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 83-87 (1956).
195. See the discussion of this point in OBI, supra note 171, at 37-40.
196. The question of the liability of the extended family for the torts of
its members cannot be separated from the institution of family property. If
the family as a legal entity "owns" property, such liability may be imposed as
it was in customary law. If individual ownership, however, is to take place,
there would seem to be no justification for imposing vicarious liability on
members of the extended family or on the family as an institution. On the
subject generally see Deng, The Family and the Law of Torts in African Cus-
tomary Law, 4 HOUSTON L. REV. 1 (1966).
197. This was the approach taken in Ethiopia. See the discussion in
Sedler, supra note 20, at 598.
198. For a discussion of some of the problems in determining whether
customary or received law is to apply to Africans in this area, see Phillips,
Marriage and Divorce Laws in East Africa, 3 J. AFR. L. 93 (1959). ALLOTT,
supra note 174, at 209-18,
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implications for economic development and modernization, cannot
be ignored. As we will see, a number of efforts at reform have
already begun. There are two basic questions to be considered. The
first is whether it is possible to establish a uniform body of family
law which will be sufficiently acceptable to all the ethnic groups in
the nation. The second, and more important, is whether the law
should be employed in an attempt to change existing patterns of
family relationships and behavior which may be detrimental to the
objectives of development and modernization. Since we are here
dealing with inter-personal relationships and behavior patterns which
are deeply-rooted in tradition, any attempt to employ the law as a
technique of social ordering should not be undertaken lightly, and the
anticipated degree of resistance must be taken into account. The
limitations on law as a technique of social ordering must be realized,
and it may be necessary to leave some matters to the evolutionary
change that will be brought about by modernization and the resulting
changes in values.
When we examine the present behavior patterns with respect to
the nuclear family, our concern can focus primarily on the institution
of polygamy and on the position of the wife in the marriage relation-
ship. Forced marriages, particularly of young girls, are recognized in
certain systems of customary law. Likewise, in some systems levirate
marriage prevails, and generally provision is not made for support
of the widow after her husband's death. Finally, a customary mar-
riage is usually capable of being dissolved without the limitations
imposed by a rigid set of "grounds for divorce."'99  While marriage
may be something more than the "transfer of the wife's reproductive
organs from her family to that of the husbands," 200 the fact remains
that the primary loyalty of each spouse runs to his or her extended
family, and the marriage in customary society is not regarded as an
enduring (or endearing) relationship. 201
Again, this attitude toward the marriage relationship and the
blood family is not something that is within the power of the law to
change. Moreover, if the primary function of marriage is to insure
the procreation and protection of children, customary marriage per-
forms the function well.20 2  Rather the question is whether the
social problems which may be caused by the operation of present
family system can be reached by legal action. These problems essen-
tially rise from the inferior status of women in the traditional society.
It is said that in customary law women are in "perpetual minority. '203
199. See the discussion in TWINING, supra note 175, at 19-20.
200. See Deng, supra note 196, at 27-28.
201. See the discussion in ALLOTT, supra note 174, at 213-14.
202. For some interesting variants resulting from the fact that the primary
purpose of marriage in African society is procreation, see Deng, supra note
196, at 7-11.
203. Phillips, supra note 198, at 97.
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Prior to marriage they are under the control of the male head of their
family; during marriage, under the control of the husband; when the
marriage terminates by death or divorce, they are either forced into
levirate marriage or revert to the control of their own family. They
may be forced to enter into marriage, sometimes at a very young age.
And, of course, polygamy is widespread, which may further aggravate
the disadvantaged status of the wife.
Various efforts have been made to deal with some of these
problems. In some places legislation has been enacted setting a
minimum age for marriage and voiding all marriages, including
customary ones, where a party is below that age.2 4  However,
whether there has been compliance is questionable, 20 5 and in this
kind of situation the ability of the law to change behavior patterns by
the imposition of sanctions is limited. Other legislation has prohibited
levirate marriages, while providing support for the widow and
children of the deceased.206 Efforts have also been made to give the
widow custody of the children in preference to the husband's fam-
ly.207 Malawi made a "radical change" in succession by providing
that in case of intestacy, four-fifths of the deceased's property should
pass to the wife and children while only one-fifth would pass under
customary law, 20 8 which is contrary to the almost universal rule of
customary law denying spousal succession and keeping the property
in the blood family.20 9 Further reform along these lines may be
anticipated, particularly if efforts to establish a uniform family law
are undertaken.
The most serious social implications, however, are those that
arise from polygamy and unlimited divorce. In this respect the
situation is the same as in Islamic countries, where Sharia law not
only authorizes polygamy, but appears to make it a duty.210 During
colonial times polygamy was tolerated, and no attempt was made to
suppress it by legislation. Instead it is said that "reliance was
placed on the gradual advance of education and enlightenment and
on the pressure of economic and social conditions favoring monog-
amy.211 Polygamy is a sound institution in the subsistence society,
204. See KASUNMU & SALACUSE, supra note 175, at 77.
205. Id.
206. See Phillips, supra note 198, at 98.
207. See KASUNMU & SALACUSE, supra note 175, at 19-20.
208. See Roberts, A Revolution in the Law of Succession in Malawi, 10
J. AFR. L. 21 (1966).
209. Efforts to provide for spousal succession in Ethiopia were rejected by
the Codification Commission. See the discussion in Sedler, supra note 20,
at 582.
210. In Sub-Saharan countries such as the Sudan and Somalia, which have
predominantly Moslem populations, the problem will have to be approached
in the context of reform of Sharia law. On that subject see ANDERSON, ISLAMIC
LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD, ch. 3 (1959). The discussion that follows deals
with polygamous marriage under the customary laws of non-Moslem peoples.
211. Phillips, supra note 198, at 95.
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where more wives and children mean that more land can be worked.
But it is completely unsuited for life in urban areas, where people
work for wages and living space is limited.212 Moreover, changes in
the system of land tenure may or may not affect the economic
feasibility of polygamy. If an individual may acquire fairly extensive
quantities of land, large number of wives and children would still
be useful. But to the extent that land holdings are consolidated in
cooperatives and the like, the utility of the institution will be lessened.
And insofar as people begin to work for wages, plural marriage will
be a burden rather than a blessing. The point I am trying to make
is that among Africans, other than Moslems, there seem to be no
religious strictures surrounding the institution, and it is economic
factors that apparently determine its incidence. As economic con-
ditions change, it is likely to decline, and it is questionable whether
affirmative action to eliminate it immediately is vitally necessary.
On the other hand, the duality of the present legal system, with
monogamous marriage under the ordinance and polygamous marriage
under different regimes of customary law, may give some impetus for
reform. A decision may be reached to hasten the decline of polygamy
by what may be called the "gentle persuasion of the law" rather than
by severe sanction. This could take the form of providing for regis-
tration of marriages and allowing the registration of only the first
marriage. Only the "registered" wife would have legal status. This
approach had some positive effect in Turkey, where during the
Korean War, it was realized that only a "legal marriage" would
justify marriage allowances and widows' pensions. 213 In other words,
a practical compromise would be reached. Under the law only
monogamous marriage would be recognized-although we would hope
that the children of the other "wives" would not be penalized.
214
But no affirmative sanctions would be imposed against persons who
entered into polygamous unions, e.g., bigamy would not be made an
offense. Other efforts aimed at encouraging its decline might be
tried. The point is that a decision will have to be made as to whether
or not the law will be employed at this time to attempt to alter this
pattern of behavior, or whether the solution of the problem can be
left to evolutionary social change and the resulting change in values.
It is doubtful, however, that a uniform family law would give legal
recognition to polygamy.
2 15
We may next consider the matter of divorce. It is now clear that
212. See Seidman, Law and Economic Development in Independent, Eng-
lish-Speaking, Sub-Saharan Africa, 1966 Wis. L. Rzv. 999, 1002.
213. See ANDERSON, supra note 210, at 89.
214. The rights of children can be established through filiation, which
need not depend on their "legitimacy."
215. For the view that the abolition of polygamy must be a "response
to social change," see FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 11-12 (1959).
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in Moslem societies, it was the Islamic law of divorce, not polygamy,
which was the major cause of suffering of women.216 African cus-
tomary law differs markedly from Islamic law in this respect, and the
women receive somewhat more protection. Although grounds for
divorce, as we know them, are not required, the husband cannot
unilaterally terminate the marriage as he may under Islamic law.
The marital problems are submitted to the families of the spouses,
and efforts at arbitration are undertaken. If the parties cannot be
reconciled, the arbitrators settle accounts and decree the divorce.
217
So long as adequate protection is given to the wife, particularly
support and perhaps a right to custody of the children, customary
divorce will not cause her suffering. Existing practices in this regard
must be carefully explored, and changes may have to be made to
insure that the wife is adequately protected.
Thus, the institutions of polygamy and unlimited divorce, while
somewhat disadvantageous to the woman, do not for the most part
create such serious social problems that immediate and sweeping
corrective action is necessary. In fact, research into actual practices
may indicate that the position of the woman in the traditional African
society is not so disadvantaged as is generally believed. 218 Particular
problems such as forced and levirate marriage and protection for the
wife upon dissolution of the marriage, can be dealt with directly, but
the practical effect of these reforms may not be felt immediately.
Polygamy is likely to decline as economic and social change takes
place. For these reasons, extensive law reform in these areas is not
likely to be undertaken at the present time.
A further question may arise as to the basis of divorce. Again,
under the present system there are two radically different approaches
to divorce: consensual divorce under customary law and "grounded"
divorce under the received law. If the law is to be unified, and a
single law of divorce is to be established, how are these seemingly
contradictory approaches to be reconciled? I would submit that here
the received law could "learn" from the customary law. We are
coming more and more to realize that there is only one true ground
for divorce, that of "incompatibility." We also know that the great
majority of divorces that are granted in our courts are completely
consensual with "grounds" often being fictitious. In the rare case
when a divorce is contested, it is usually for financial or religious
reasons. The African family pattern has been one of relative stability
notwithstanding frequent divorce and remarriage, even within the
polygamous structure. Moreover, the use of family arbitrators rather
than the courts to deal with marital problems has the further ad-
216. ANDERSON, supra note 210.
217. See ALLOTT, supra note 174, at 220-21.
218. See generally PAULME, WOMEN OF TROPICAL AFRICA (1963).
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vantage of providing the opportunity for reconciliation. 219 This ques-
tion was faced in Ethiopia at the time of the adoption of the Civil
Code. The traditional practice authorized divorce, in effect, when
one of the parties insisted on it. The drafter proposed that divorce
be granted only on certain grounds, but the Codification Commission
rejected the proposal. Again, in keeping with tradition, the code
provides for marital arbitration, and the courts have no jurisdiction
except to "homologate" a divorce granted by the family arbitrators.
The arbitrators have a period of time within which to try to reconcile
the parties, but if that fails divorce must be granted. 220  The same
solution would probably be very sound for most African countries.
There is no need for the courts to bother with divorce-a proposition
with which most lower court judges in this country would agree.
Marital difficulties would be referred to family arbitrators, and the
traditional procedures would be institutionalized in the new law. The
arbitrators would try to reconcile the parties, as they have been
doing, but if this failed, they would decree the divorce, make a
property settlement and award custody of the children. Perhaps
provision might be made for the court to review property settlements
and custody awards if there was objection. The customary approach
to divorce did not threaten family stability, and may be sounder for
the modern legal system than that found in the received law.
Our analysis of the African family system, then, has led us to
the conclusion that it is not necessary to employ the process of the law
to attempt a radical social reordering at this time. Law reform in
this area should take the form of the establishment of a uniform body
of family law to eliminate "the uncertainties and anomalies made
possible by a plurality of marriages law, which lead to situations 'too
fantastic for the plot of a comic opera.' "221 If there is substantial
similarity among the different customary laws in essential matters,
this should not be difficult. Particular problems such as forced and
levirate marriage and protection for the wife upon dissolution of the
marriage, can be dealt with directly. Whatever "legal" position is
taken with respect to polygamy will probably not make much differ-
ence. The institution cannot effectively be eliminated at this time,
and it does not appear to be detrimental to economic progress and
social stability, More importantly, it apparently is rooted in economic
factors rather than in deeply-held religious values, and as economic
and social conditions change, it will gradually disappear. The tradi-
tional approach to divorce and the resolution of family difficulties has
much to commend itself for the modern society, and it can be incor-
porated into the legal system. A unified system of family law along
219. We are now attempting to "build-in" reconciliation by establishing
family courts or attaching social workers to the courts. However, by the
time a case reaches that stage, it is probably too late for reconciliation.
220. See the discussion in Sedler, supra note 20, at 598.
221. TWINING, supra note 175, at 20.
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these lines would, it is submitted, be suitable for these countries at
this time.
LAW REFORM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
As we pointed out at the beginning of the writing, economic
development is the focal concern of the emerging nations of sub-
Saharan Africa. If this is so, the most significant aspect of law reform
is likely to be in those areas of the law that regulate economic relation-
ships. It is here that the use of law as a means of changing patterns
of behavior will have the most immediate effect, and for this reason
the matter of law reform cannot be separated from the objectives
sought to be achieved by economic development. It will be the
function of the law to implement these objectives, so that law reform
in this context becomes an integral part of the planned economic
development that is taking place.
A. The African Economic Picture
The level of economic development in African states at the time
of emergence demonstrates the necessity for radical change in
patterns of economic behavior. This level of development is reflected
in the conditions of African life, and the situation has been described
as follows:
Traditional systems of cultivation and grazing, characterized by
low production per man and low productivity per acre, prevail over
the larger part of the tropics. The rates of illiteracy, incidence of
disease, infant mortality and death remain high. The per cent of
persons actually attending school is low, particularly for high
schools and advanced educational institutions. Standards of housing
and sanitation often leave much to be desired. Diets are not usually
short in provision of calories, but protein intake is below require-
ments despite the very large livestock population of the conti-
nent....
Average annual per capita incomes for tropical Africa are about
$110-115, with some countries still having averages half that le-
vel....
About three-fifths of the total cultivated area of tropical Africa
is still devoted to subsistence production, which occupies over half
the adult population. In 1965, tropical Africa accounted for only
about 2.79 per cent of total world imports and 2.69 per cent of ex-
ports. Its population is about 6.55 per cent of the world total . ... 222
It was on this basis that the efforts at planned economic development
were undertaken.
Thus far, the results of these efforts have been mixed. There
are striking contrasts in the rates of economic advance from country
to country and within individual countries.223  Realistically, there
are economic "islands" in which the bulk of the economic output is
222. HANCE, AFRicAN EcONOMuC DEVELOPMENT 2-3 (1967).
223. Id. at 5.
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highly concentrated, and these "islands" are often separated by great
spaces in which the exchange economy is poorly developed. It is
these islands---classified as either coastal, highland or mineral-which
account for at least 85% of economic output, although they comprise
less than 5% of the total land area.
224
The growth rate of the African economy has now slackened. In
the period from 1945 to 1960 economic growth in Africa was at least as
fast as in any other underdeveloped region, with the gross national
product rising between 4 and 6 per cent per year in real terms. Dur-
ing those years some $15 billion of capital from abroad came into
Africa, making possible the minimum infrastructure for develop-
ment. 225 However, this growth slowed down in the post independ-
ence period, notwithstanding the directed efforts at economic de-
velopment that were being made. In the "development decade" of
the 1960's, growth has been between 3 and 3.5% at a time when popula-
tion was increasing at a rate of 2.4%.226 Of course, the base level was
higher, but this is not the only explanation for the slowdown. There
has been a markedly unfavorable change in the terms of trade for
most countries, affecting however, the various countries unevenly
and differently from year to year. African countries are essentially
exporters of primary products and importers of secondary poducts.
Prices of primary products are less subject to control by the producers,
and extensive production depresses prices. African countries, on the
whole, must pay prices that are between 10 and 15% higher than they
were in 1955-57 while the prices of the commodities they sell de-
creased year by year to 1962, although they have recovered somewhat
since. The result is that African terms of trade are still 10 to 20%
below 1955-57 levels.227 There has also been a reduction in the rate
of capital investment and a flight of capital from some countries.228
Political upheavals in some countries could not help but have an
adverse effect on the economy, discouraging influx and encouraging
outflow of capital. The rapid transfer from colonial to independent
government, with the departure of trained expatriate personnel, has
caused the standard of administration to deteriorate.229  And the
planning process itself has produced a number of failures.M
All of this merely means that improved and redoubled efforts are
necessary. Planning and efforts at rapid economic development will
continue apace, although this now may be tempered with a better
sense of the "really formidable problems that beset development in
224. Id.
225. KAMARCK, THE ECONOMICS OF ARicAN DEVELOPMENT 17-18 (1967).
226. HANCE, supra note 222, at 7.
227. KAMARCK, supra note 225, at 18-19.
228. HANCE, supra note 222, at 7.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 6; KAMARCK, supra note 225, at 210-15.
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underdeveloped areas."'23 ' In fact, it has been contended that the
results could have been more unfavorable and that there has been
"relative success" so that "even with all of her inexperience, Africa's
efforts to achieve economic development compare favorably with
those of the major developing regions of the world. '23 2 Whatever the
analysis of the degree of success achieved thus far, the fact remains
that the process of planned development will continue, and the law
must be employed to aid in that process.
The basis of economic development will necessarily be agriculture.
Some 92% of the Africans still live on farms. Almost two-thirds of
Africa's exports are agricultural products, and these are the principal
source of foreign exchange earnings for practically all African coun-
tries. 23 3 Likewise, agriculture produces from 50% to as high as 70% of
the gross national product in a given country.23 4 As a result:
For most African countries, then, it is agriculture that must
be depended on: to raise the standard of living of the people ini-
tially, to provide the minimum market necessary for manufacturers
to get a foothold, to earn the necessary foreign exchange to pay
for imports, and to provide the revenues to finance needed govern-
ment services. The improvement of agriculture must be the cen-
tral part of any development program.28 5
When we are talking about economic development in Africa, then,
we are talking essentially about the development of an agricultural
economy.
This, in itself, presents problems. Unlike manufacturing, the
conditions of agricultural production-climate, soil, plant and animal
disease, and the like-cannot be easily controlled. In agriculture,
management has to be highly decentralized, and the individual farmer
or worker in the fields must constantly be making decisions. So much
more so than in manufacturing, does success depend on the pro-
ductivity of the individual worker, on his attitude toward work and
his power to make intelligent decisions. 23 1 Nor can production be
limited as in manufacturing so as to regulate the supply and with it
the price of the product.
But in Africa the problems of agricultural development are still
more complex. The agricultural economy that presently exists is to a
large extent based on subsistence farming in which the farmer pro-
duces mainly to feed himself and his family.23 7 As long as farming
is carried on for this purpose, shifting cultivation, involving the use
231. HANCE, supra note 222, at 7.
232. KAMARCK, supra note 225, at 29.
233. Id. at 89. See also HANCE, supra note 222, at 20-21.
234. KAMARCK, supra note 225, at 32-33. Only in Zambia, Kinshasa
(Congo-Leopoldville) and probably Mauretania among the states of black
Africa (we necessarily exclude South Africa) does the contribution of mining
and manufacturing to the gross national product exceed that of agriculture.
235. Id. at 89-90.
236. Id. at 90.
g37. Id. at 99,
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of weak soils, is more likely, since this method produces the bare
minimum for survival.238  In fact, in terms of the activity of the
average African, the subsistence element is the dominant one in the
total economy. The amount of time that an African spends on
activities that merely keep him alive and functioning is greater than
the amount of time he spends working for money; for him the goods
and services produced within his household or by his family members
are more important and include more of the necessities of life than
the goods he buys or sells.239 A subsistence economy also has sig-
nificant social and psychological effects. It is impossible to provide a
margin of security for one's family-there is always the danger of a
"hungry season" when the last season's crop has been eaten and the
new crops have not yet come in.2 40 This in turn creates a fatalistic
philosophy, since the individual does not believe that he can control
the future or the conditions of his environment.241 And to the extent
that survival depends upon the joint efforts of a community, indi-
vidual initiative and innovation are stifled.
242
With the advent of modernization, a transition is occurring from a
subsistence to a market economy, and in all probability most Africans
are now aware of and influenced by the place of money in the
economy. 243 The transition: from subsistence to market agriculture
is perhaps the single most important economic change taking place in
Africa today,244 and it will be important to consider whether the
present system of land law has the force of accelerating or retarding
this transition.
There are also various cultural obstacles impeding economic de-
velopment in Africa. 245  In the traditional society the possession of
property itself would sometimes confer status without regard to
whether the property had economic utility. In Ethiopia, for example,
and I would imagine in a number of other countries, ownership of
land is highly prized for its own sake, and disputes over valueless land
are frequent.246 The "cattle culture" affects certain groups, partic-
238. Id. at 97-99.
239. Id. at 33.
240. Id. at 34.
241. See the discussion of this point in HUNTER, THE NEW SOCIETIES OF
TROPICAL AFRICA 14 (1962).
242. KAMARCK, supra note 225, at 34.
243. Id. at 33-34.
244. KAMARCK, id. at 99-100, distinguishes four stages of the transition.
The fourth and final stage, where production for the market predominates,
is presently limited to cocoa farmers in Ghana and western Nigeria and the
coffee producers of the Buganda region of Uganda. The transition also has
significant implications for the domestic market. See the discussion in HANCE,
supra note 222, at 21.
245. This is in addition to the formidable physical ones. For a discussion
of the latter see HANCE, supra note 222, at 17-19.
246. It is estimated in Ethiopia that better than 50% of all litigation in-
volves land. Moreover, a great deal of land owned by large landholders is
often not utilized because (1) the retention of the land enhances the owner's
status, and (2) the profits on the portion utilized supply him with sufficient
cash.
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ularly nomadic and semi-nomadic ones, and those where cattle is the
basis of bridewealth. Livestock becomes degraded, and the emphasis
is on number rather than quality. Grazing land is almost universally
in poor condition. 47 Another problem is the absence of any concept
of positive value in work. Work is no more than a survival imperative
in the subsistence economy. So too, the concept of "time-motion" is
lacking. The important thing becomes the social enjoyment derived
from performing a task rather than the rapidity or economy of
effort.248  We have previously discussed some of the difficulties
caused by the extended family system and its inhibiting effect on
individual initiative. Likewise, traditional methods of farming may
have a cultural (and perhaps a religious) significance, and a change in
behavior patterns may be resisted.249 On the other hand, there is
evidence to the contrary, evidence showing that the African is open
to innovation, and that he will change his ways if sufficient incentive
is provided and probability of success is demonstrated. In most
African societies, the farmers are not deeply attached to a particular
piece of land and will move as new land is available.250  On the
whole, however, traditional behavior patterns and attitudes are an
inhibitory factor. And, as we will see, the traditional systems of land
tenure, as reflected in the customary law, are built around these
behavior patterns and attitudes.
The above discussion is designed to demonstrate the difficulty
and complexity of economic development in Africa today. This makes
the role of law in promoting this development all the more signif-
icant. For, as we have pointed out at the beginning of this writing,
it is the organs of government which will be directing the develop-
ment. There is simply no time to wait for change to take place
"through the unhurried dialectic of the market. '251 An affirmative
response of government is demanded, and development will take
place according to a national plan.2 5 2 Insofar as existing behavior
patterns and methods of land utilization are inhibiting this develop-
ment and preventing realization of the goals of the plan, the law may
be called upon to bring about a change. In this context, law as a
technique of social ordering may be indispensable to economic develop-
ment. With this perspective it may be said that the most important
body of law is that applicable to economic relationships, and in this
area the law must provide affirmative direction.
247. HANCE, supra note 222, at 27.
248. KAMARCK, supra note 225, at 54, 101-02. The author points out that
"this pattern often results in a decision not to put in more labor when that
labor gives more income but at a sharply diminishing rate of return."
249. See the discussion in WARD, supra note 9, at 106.
250. KAMARCK, supra note 225, at 48-49, 101.
251. Seidman, supra note 212, at 1018.
252. See the discussion in FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO PRIVATE
INVESTORS 35 (1962).
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B. The Imperatives of Law Reform
How does all of this relate to law reform? In the first place
economic considerations must be given prominence in the establish-
ment of the general body of law applicable to dispute resolution and
problem adjustment. The substantive provisions must take account
of the effect that a given rule of law may have on the creation of the
conditions and the climate necessary for economic development. More
importantly, a comprehensive and codified body of modern law
affecting business and commercial relationships must be established.
It will not be enough merely to apply the received English law;
modern codes, reflecting African business and economic conditions,
are a necessity. Here we are talking about sales law, insurance,
bankruptcy, security transactions and so on. As Professor Seidman
has pointed out, "The list of areas requiring modernization to create
a suitable legal climate appropriate to modern systems of trade,
industrialization, and finance could be multiplied almost endlessly. '253
So too, is there a need to deal with labor problems and to provide for
the regulation of businesses affected with the public interest.25 4 In
all these areas the law must be modernized so as to be suitable for
economic development in the modern world, codified to remove the
inhibition caused by uncertainty, and adapted to the needs of the
particular country, as it is engaged in the process of development.2 55
Since, as we have stated, the basis of economic development
will be agriculture, it follows that the most important aspect of law
reform will be that relating to the law governing land tenure and
land utilization. This is all the more true, for, as will be seen, the
present systems of land tenure and land utilization, which are rein-
forced by existing law, clearly have an inhibiting effect upon
economic development. Not only will the law have to be employed
to change patterns of behavior with respect to land holding and
land use, but the law itself, in its present state, perpetuates and
perhaps causes undesirable economic practices. It is important to
distinguish reform of land law from what is popularly called "land
reform." Land reform generally concerns the redistribution of land
and "the breaking up of the large estates of the few to satisfy the land
hunger of the many." It involves the transfer of possession and
ownership of land to those individuals and groups who did not hold
land under the existing political and economic system. The concern
is with a more equitable distribution of the wealth represented by
land. Of course, as land reform takes place, land law will likewise
have to be changed, particularly where land reform changes existing
relationships, e.g., where the person working the land is given owner-
253. Seidman, supra note 212, at 1029.
254. Id. at 1054-55.
255. See the discussion, id. at 1028-32.
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ship. The reform of land law, as we are using the term, refers to
changes in the existing law relating to the method of landholding,
that is, land tenure and land utilization, in order to change behavior
patterns with respect to the land and to increase its economic pro-
ductivity. Redistribution of wealth is not necessarily involved, and
the emphasis is on the increased productivity and more effective
utilization of al land. For exanple, if all the people have some land,
but the land is being used for subsistence farming, there is no need to
undertake land reform. But there is the need to change the patterns
of behavior involved in subsistence farming and to channel the use of
the land into the market economy. In this situation the question is
whether the law may be employed to bring about a change in those
behavior patterns resulting in the present method of land use. To the
extent that the existing law relating to land does not achieve this
objective, that law must be reformed. Perhaps the above distinction
is not fully satisfactory, but it will serve to define what we mean by
reform of land law: the change in existing law to eliminate problems
in land utilization that may be caused by that law and the use of the
new law as means of changing behavior patterns so that productivity
and land utilization may be improved.256
The present system of land law in these countries follows the
general pattern of the pluralistic order, with the received English law
governing land relationships for a small number of people, while the
major part of land occupied by Africans is held under the various
regimes of customary law. 257 This means that the law applicable to
land tenure and land utilization in most cases is the law which reflects
the behavior patterns and attitudes toward land that exist in the
traditional society. The nature of that law is not such as to alter
behavior patterns and attitudes, but by definition, the law develops in
response to those patterns and attitudes. Insofar then as the present
methods of land tenure and land utilization are impeding economic
development, it follows that retention of the existing land law neces-
sarily will have the same effect. If the law is to deal with ' the
problems of agricultural development in any meaningful way, re-
form of the existing land law becomes imperative. However, to
apply the received English law as such to the problems of land
tenure and utilization would not appear to be a sound solution, since
that law was not developed with reference to African needs or to the
256. The distinction comes out very clearly in Ethiopia. The provisions
of the Civil Code dealing with property create a uniform law, designed to
eliminate many of the traditional practices interfering with efficient land
utilization. However, the code did not attempt to achieve a redistribution of
land nor to significantly affect the relationships between large landowners and
sharecroppers that prevail in many parts of the country. Until the latter sit-
uation is drastically changed, agricultural development will be restricted.
257. TWINING, THE PLACE OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN THE NATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF EAST AFRICA 18-19. See also Park, A Dual System of Land Tenure:
The Experience of Southern Nigeria, 9 J. APR. L. 1 (1965).
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objectives of African economic development. What is needed is a
new and uniform law, designed to deal with the problems created by
the present system of land tenure and land utilization, and to change
present behavior patterns and attitudes toward land. Only by such
direct action can the agricultural economy ultimately be transformed
from its present, largely subsistence state, to one producing for the
market, and providing the basis for further economic development.
In this area law reform is clearly indispensable to economic progress.
We may first look at the existing patterns of land tenure and
land utilization, which are reflected in the customary law, and, there-
fore, are reinforced by the fact that most land is held under customary
law. Although there are differences in the various land-tenure sys-
tems, all are founded on the principle of communal or tribal tenure
and are based on the assumptions that 1) land has no scarcity value
and 2) the right to use it depends on membership in or consent of the
community as a whole.258 The African's traditional conception of
land ownership is reflected in the classical statement of a Nigerian
chief to the West African Lands Committee in 1912: "I conceive
that land belongs to a vast family of which many are dead, few are
living, and countless members are unborn. 259 This type of tenure
is perfectly suitable for a relatively small population, practicing shift-
ing cultivation, and living in the subsistence economy, since there is
no question of scarcity nor permanency, and little is expected from
the land.2 60 The essential elements of the system have been described
as follows:
The land law of the tribes, in all their infinite varieties, ac-
commodates itself to the twin facts of a relative abundance of va-
cant land and plots brought to fruition by the efforts of individual
families. In the more centralized states, allodial ownership is in
the larger community-the stool in West Africa, the chief or other
rulers in East Africa. In less centralized societies, allodial owner-
ship is frequently in some smaller group-a village, lineage or
family. However, the nominal "owner" must allocate portions of
unoccupied land either directly to individual members of the rele-
vant group or to subgroups, who in turn must allocate on demand
to their individual members, as for example, among the Lozi or the
Ashanti. In most systems, the right to exclusive possession of the
plot in the individual or family to whom it has been allotted cannot
be tampered with by the allotting authority (save in very excep-
tional circumstances) so long as it is being used. Upon its being
abandoned to the bush, however, the former occupier has no further
rights in the land, and it reverts to the control of the allotting au-
thority. 2
61
258. KAMARCK, supra note 225, at 106. See also MEEK, LAND LAW AND
CUSTOM IN THE COLONIES 7 (2d ed., 1949).
259. Quoted in ELIAS, THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 162
(1956). The author also observes that "[T]he universality of this concept
throughout both Sudanese and Bantu Africa has been confirmed again and
again wherever indigenous societies have been studied."
260. See MEEK, supra note 258, at 3-4, for a discussion of the relationship
between land tenure and methods of cultivation.
261. Seidman, supra note 212, at 1005-06.
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Land is generally classified into that which belongs to the whole
community such as sacred plots or wood forests, private land which
has been allotted to individuals or groups, often passing to their
heirs, and unallotted land, which is vacant at a particular time. The
area covered by the latter category contracts whenever a new alloca-
tion is made by the allotting authority and expands when cultivation
is abandoned by the individual or group to which it has been
allotted. 26 2 The classification is Significant for internal purposes only.
The totality of the land is often clothed with religious significance,
and any transfer of family land to an outsider would traditionally
have been considered an outrage likely to bring about serious mis-
fortune.2
s3
The system, it must be remembered, was founded on the assump-
tion of land scarcity and the working of the land by shifting cultiva-
tion. As population increases and threatens to outgrow available
land-and, in any event, if land yield is to be improved-shifting
cultivation must give way to rotational farming.26 4 The assumptions
on which the system was founded (at least the economic ones) are
inconsistent with the establishment of permanent farms. Economists
believe that if land is to be used for any purpose other than sub-
sistence, it is necesary to give the individual farmer permanent
rights to the land he is cultivating. If the incentive theory has any
validity, it is clear that the farmer will need a great deal of incentive
to undertake permanent cultivation. He must invest labor and per-
haps capital to build up the quality of the soil, to improve the
drainage by digging ditches or changing the slope, and protect the
crops and stop wind erosion by planting trees or building fences. If
the farmer is to make such an investment, he must feel that he has
security of tenure for himself and for future generations. And if he
is to borrow capital, the best security is the land itself, so that he must
be given the power to encumber it.
26 5
If agriculture is to be organized on a commercial basis, that is, if
the subsistence economy is to be converted into a market one,
permanent cultivation must be undertaken. Today, cash crops are
becoming more and more prevalent, and coupled with population
growth, are giving increased economic value to rights in land.
266 It
is these cash crops on which the future of agricultural development
262. See the discussion in MUGERWA, EAST AFRICAN LAW TODAY 101, 104-
05 (1966).
263. COKER, FAMILY PROPERTY AMONG THE YORuBAS (1966). See also
Asante, Interests in Land in the Customary Law in Ghana-A New Appraisal,
74 YALE L.J. 848, 852 (1965). However, this religious significance did not
prevent the stools from granting long-term concessions to mining concerns.
The mining concerns, while recognizing the allodial title of the stool, dealt
with the land as if they were absolute owners. Asante, supra at 860-62.
264. See the discussion in MEEK, supra note 258, at 2.
265. KAMARCK, supra note 225, at 106-07.
266. Id. at 107-08.
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depends. And yet the law governing most of the land held in Africa
is based on a system that arose at a time when land did not have
scarcity value and was being cultivated on the subsistence principle.
Perhaps in some places the substance of the customary law has been
altered to take account of changing economic conditions.2 67 How-
ever, this has not been true as a general proposition, and as a member
of a Royal Commission investigating land conditions in Kenya stated:
It is clear that the root cause of the economic backwardness of
various African territories, as well as of the native areas in the
Union [of South Africa] lies in the failure to modify customary
control of land occupation and tenure, which has prevented the
emergence of land use and ownership compatible with modern forms
of commercialized production in a money economy. The failure to
make of the land a viable economic factor of production has con-
demned the peoples on it to eke out a precarious subsistence. 268
It can be contended that the very theory on which customary land
tenure is founded is inconsistent with the goals of economic develop-
ment, which, in itself, would justify significant reform.
There are a number of specific areas in which the detrimental
effects of the traditional system of land tenure and utilization, and
the customary law which has developed from it, are evident. Custom-
ary law necessarily inhibits certainty of title, since the rules are
unwritten and, therefore, subject to misinterpretation and dispute,
which in turn gives rise to frequent litigation. Boundaries are equally
imprecise and may depend on the memory of neighbors for their
effectiveness. 269 Insecurity of title further reduces the incentive of
the occupier to permanently cultivate the land, and to the extent
that the land is alienable, inhibits its purchase. Also, customary
law does not recognize prescription. While an individual may lose
his right to occupation by non-use, the family title is indefeasible
and there is always a right of reverter in the family as the land-
owning unit.270  This impairs the use of land as collateral security,
since land pledged to strangers is, under customary law,271 recover-
able by the original pledgor and his successors from the original
pledgee or his successors without limitation.
2 72
Since the land belongs to the communal group, alienation by
the individual occupier is theoretically and legally impossible. Al-
267. Id. at 109. The most comprehensive investigation of this phenomenon
is Asante, supra note 263.
268. FRANKEL, THE TYRANNY OF ECONOMIC PATERNALISM IN AFRICA (1960),
quoted in KAMARCK, supra note 225, at 108.
269. Seidman, supra note 212, at 1046.
270. See the discussion in ELIAS, supra note 259, at 166. See also COKER,
supra note 263, at 62-63.
271. It may be queried if customary law would govern such a transaction
in all cases. Suppose the lender were a commercial institution. Might not the
courts find an "intention to be bound by English law?"
272. ELIAS, supra note 259, at 167-68. The author points out, however,
that customary law does recognize abandonment and that adverse possession
is strong presumptive evidence of abandonment.
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though it can be alienated by the communal group,273 internal rules
of customary law requiring consent of the different sub-groups may
present problems.27 4 Commercial agricultural enterprises and indus-
try seeking plant sites do not as a result have easy accessibility to
land, so long as most land is held communally.275  Moreover, the
occupier is unlikely to invest in land that he cannot alienate, since he
may be unable to realize his investment if he must move.
2 7 6
Since land is held communally, in the course of time holdings are
likely to become fragmented. Population pressures may have reduced
the amount of land available for farming so that shifting cultivation
becomes less feasible.27 7 Small plots of land, to be permanently
cultivated by a nuclear family or sub-group, become the rule. As
that family or sub-group increases, less land must support more
people, until a condition of subsistence is reached. This is com-
pounded by the customary rules governing succession, which recog-
nize the right of each family member to a share of the land, and with
each generation the plots become smaller and smaller s. 2 7  From the
standpoint of the economic productivity of land, it would be desirable
if some members of the family were disinherited and forced to leave
the land. Admittedly this would present additional problems, but so
long as everyone can claim a piece of family land, no matter how
small, there is less incentive to learn other "marketable skills." The
present system of land tenure thus operates to bind people even more
firmly to the traditional society.
There can be no doubt that the present system of land tenure
and methods of utilization have an inhibiting effect upon economic
development. Notwithstanding, they are given legal sanction insofar
as matters relating to land are governed by customary law. If these
patterns of tenure and utilization are to be altered, drastic law reform,
so to speak, is necessary. A discussion of all the problems to be dealt
with and alternative methods of solution is beyond the scope of this
paper, and indeed, the author's competence. However, in the remain-
ing pages I propose to discuss some of the reforms that have been
undertaken in various places and to indicate at least the structural
basis of land law reform.
The nature and direction of the reform will depend on the
government's economic policy and its view on how the economy can
be most effectively developed. If it is envisaged that the private
273. Seidman, supra note 212, at 1047; OBI, MODERN FAMILY LAW IN
SouTHER NIGERIA 83 (1966).
274. OBR, supra note 273, at 84. He points out, however, that even if such
consents are not obtained, the sale is voidable rather than void.
275. KAMARCK, supra note 225, at 164. See also the discussion in Williams,
supra note 139, at 80-81.
276. Mr. Asante is of the view that in Ghana the possessor could alienate
the land freely to another member of the stool. Asante, supra note 263, at 873.
277. See the discussion in Seidman, supra note 212, at 1048.
278. Id. at 1048-49.
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sector shall have the primary responsibility, that is, that development
will take place by the infusion of private capital and individual
entrepreneurship, the principal demands of reform would seem to be
clarity of title, alienability and relief from fragmentation.27 9 The
community as a legal entity would cease to be the allocator and
"owner" of land, and ownership, including the power to alienate,
would be vested in individuals or at least nuclear families. Succession
law would be directed toward preventing fragmentation and excessive
tying up of the land. The system of registration, which heretofore
has generally been limited to European-held and urban land,2 0 would
be extended to all land as rapidly as possible.28 ' In short, the modern
land law would be based on the received English law, but adapted to
the particular problems of the African state and hopefully without
the artificial doctrines that have been encrusted into the English law
of real property.
28 2
But agricultural development need not follow this path. The
collective principle of customary law can be retained so as to promote
the establishment of cooperative ventures. 283 Or, the government
may decide to expand on the collective principle by undertaking
large-scale resettlement on state-operated farms. If it adopts the
latter approach, it may look to the land laws of socialist countries for
its model. Another approach might favor a mixed system with
private, cooperative and state holdings. The decision as to the kind of
agricultural development will be one based on economic, social and
perhaps political considerations. Once that decision is made, a new
body of law must be fashioned to provide the means of implementa-
tion. In the clearest form, law then serves as a technique of social
ordering. Its sanctions 28 4 are employed to alter patterns of behavior
so as to achieve the objectives of the society, objectives that, as we
pointed out earlier, are based on the value system of the indigenous
elite who now hold the reins of power. But it is only by this kind of
radical reform of existing land law that sound economic planning
and development can take place.
This kind of overall reform has not yet been achieved. However, a
number of specific reforms have been made in an effort to bring
methods of land tenure and utilization into line with the needs of
economic development. Various land registration acts have been
enacted for the purposes of providing some security of title, but as a
practical matter they are difficult to enforce.
285 Efforts have also
279. Id. at 1049.
280. Id. at 1047, n.186.
281. Id. at 1046-47.
282. And from which American courts are only beginning to extricate
themselves.
283. See the discussion in Seidman, supra note 212, at 1049-59.
284. See HARVEY, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN GHANA 344 (1966).
285. See the discussion in Williams, supra note 139, at 80-81; Park, supra
note 257, at 18-19; MUGERWA, supra note 262, at 106, 112.
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been made to remove impediments to the establishment of freehold
tenure. In Kenya the government has issued freehold titles to some
land which was originally held under customary tenure, and in re-
settlement areas where Africans were acquiring former European
farms, the new settlers were given freehold tenure.28 6  In former
French Africa it is legally possible for all Africans to shift to freehold
tenure. A 1955 colonial law provided for the confirmation of custom-
ary rights in land and the transformation of these rights to freehold
tenure. However, the process has not gone very far except in the
most economically advanced countries such as the Ivory Coast and
Senegal. 28 7 It should also be noted that in countries such as Ghana
the substance of customary law itself has been altered in light of
changing economic conditions, so that the occupier enjoyed most of
the incidents of freehold tenure.288 In terms of resistance to change,
this should demonstrate that the principle of communal control of
land as against the right of the individual member is not deep-rooted.
The advantages of individual ownership are well-understood, and
such a change would be readily accepted by the occupiers, 2 9 though
perhaps not by the traditional authorities, whose power may thereby
be eroded.2
90
This latter aspect has been very significant in Ghana. The re-
lationship of land tenure to political control has long been recognized,
and during the colonial period the policy of indirect rule dictated
confirmation of the chief's power over communal land, although some
restrictions (in furtherance of the objectives of the colonial govern-
ment) were imposed.291 With the advent of independence and the
desire of the central government to break the power of the traditional
authorities, legislation giving the central government effective control
over stool lands was enacted. 292 Stool lands cannot be alienated
without government approval, which serves to protect the tenure of
the individual occupier.2 93 The government may also impose a trust
over stool land and administer it for the benefit of the family
members.2 94 The effect of this legislation is to treat stool lands as
national assets so that there are two dimensions to interests in land:
286. KAMARCK, supra note 225, at 108-09. The view has been expressed
that it is "inconceivable" in Kenya that all freehold title could be vested in the
state (as in Tanzania, infra). The tendency in Kenya is said to be to "en-
trench individual land rights." MUGERWA, supra note 262, at 113. Compare
the views expressed in Munro, Land Law in Kenya, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 1071. For
a discussion of the resettlement of a particular group see Homan, Land Con-
solidation and Redistribution of Population in the Imenti Sub-Tribe of the
Meru (Kenya), AFRICAN AGRARIAN SYSTEMS 224 (Biebuyck ed., 1963).
287. KAMARCK, supra note 225, at 109.
288. Asante, supra note 263.
289. See the discussion in Munro, supranote 286, at 1085.
290. See the discussion in MEEK, supra note 258, at 10.
291. See the discussion in HARVEY, supra note 284, at 107-08.
292. Id. at 113-22.
293. Asante, supra note 263, at 882-83.
294. Id. at 883-84.
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that of the government and that of individual occupier. 295 In terms
of use of the land, the system is that of freehold tenure, but-in a
clear historical analogy to early feudal times-the government has
paramount title. Thus far, individual development is the rule, but
the opportunity for government control of land utilization and the
establishment of cooperatives or state farms is clear.296
This raises the question of direct governmental control over land
utilization. If the agricultural economy is to be properly developed,
modern methods of cultivation must be employed, and capital infu-
sions into the agricultural sector will be necessary. The dilemma is,
as stated by one writer:
No agricultural advance is possible with only a hoe and four
acres; but neither will the provision of forty or four hundred acres
per farmer be of any use unless capital and knowledge, for example,
expensive mechanical techniques, are available to develop them.
In modern conditions, and in almost all countries, these are coming
more and more from Government departments and public agencies.
But if public capital is involved the greater will be the degree of
control and the greater the curtailment of private rights.
297
Government control over land utilization in an African society would
not be a radical departure from existing norms nor inconsistent with
traditional values. What is transformed is the agency of control,
which is now the government rather than the communal head.
Such a transformation may be an integral part of the ideology of
African socialism, which is based on the traditional values of com-
munalism except that direction is now to be given by the govern-
ment.298 As has been stated, "The African socialist idea is that
traditional farms can be transmuted readily and directly into large-
scale, technologically advanced farms if the government supplies
managerial direction and mechanized equipment. ' 299  Whether this
will take the form of state farms, or as is more likely, government-
sponsored cooperatives, will depend upon political and practical con-
siderations. The advantages of cooperation among farmers are
readily understood and meet with the value acceptances of the
traditional society.300 All of this leads in the direction of government
control over land allocation and utilization.
Tanzania has gone the furthest in this direction. The Freehold
Titles (Conversion and Government Leases) Act of 1963 vests all land
in the President of the Republic and abolishes freehold tenure. Land
295. Id. at 884-85.
296. See the discussion in Munro, supra note 286, at 1088.
297. Baldwin, Land Tenure Problems in Relation to Agricultural Develop-
ment in the Northern Region of Nigeria, AFRICAN AGRARIAN SYSTEMS 65, 77
(Biebuyck ed., 1963).
298. See REPUBLIC OF KENYA, AFRICAN SOCIALISM AND ITS APPLICATION
TO PLANNING IN KENYA (Gov't Printer, Kenya, 1965).
299. Drew, How Socialist Are African Economies?, AFRICA REPORT 13
(May, 1963).
300. See the discussion in Seidman, supra note 212, at 1049-50.
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is now to be held under government leasehold with a maximum
duration of 99 years. However, this legislation did not abolish custom-
ary tenures nor change the substance of the law governing rights in
land, i.e., land held by people living in rural areas in the traditional
way will be subject to the principles of customary law while estates
and urban land will be governed by English law.30 1 The change was
in the power to control the development of land, which is now vested
in the government instead of tribal authorities or freehold owners.
At present, most of the country is still in the shifting cultivation
stage, with agriculture being mainly subsistence and the population
almost static. As this changes, a reform of the substantive law applic-
able to land rights will be necessary, 30 2 and the principle has already
been established that the government will control land allocation
and utilization. 0 3 The rights of a person in land will arise out of his
status as a member of the society rather than on his ability to obtain
land by contract, and in this sense land tenure will accord with the
values of the traditional society.
In all sub-Saharan African states methods of land tenure and
utilization must be changed if economic development is to take place.
This will require a fundamental reform of the present land law, which
reinforces the status quo. However, the direction of legal change
cannot be determined without a basic normative decision.30 4 If the
development of the economy is to be accomplished primarily through
the private sector, the institution of individual ownership must be-
come firmly established. This would require the abandonment of
customary law, which is based on communal tenure, and its replace-
ment by a body of modern and uniform law, structured upon the
received law perhaps, but also adapted to the problems and needs of
the African country. On the other hand, it is equally possible-and
perhaps more in accord with traditional values-to accomplish agri-
cultural development through the public sector. If this approach is
taken, land control will be vested in the government, and individual
rights of utilization will be subordinate to the plan of development.
A mixed approach is also possible. At one point or another the
"basic normative decision" will have to be made, and whatever
direction is taken, fundamental reform in the existing land law will
follow.
301. See the discussion in MUGERWA, supra note 262, at 110-111.
302. Id. at 1011.
303. "The Government considers that the urgent need for raising the
standard of living of the people of Tanganyika and the vital importance of
agriculture in the country's economy compel it to use its power to procure
development of land." GOVERNMENT OF TANGANYIKA, PROPOSALS FOR LAND
REFORM, at 10 (1962).
304. Seidman, supra note 212, at 1051.
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CONCLUSION
Law reform is generally viewed in the perspective of the response
of law to social change. It is equally vital to consider the role of law
as an instrument to achieve social change. In the emerging nations
of sub-Saharan Africa both dimensions of law reform are graphically
presented. Nowhere else can the process of law reform be analyzed
so fruitfully, and perhaps nowhere else is law reform so crucial at
this time. For here law reform will be an integral part of revolution-
ary and fundamental social change. The ability of the law, on the
one hand, to accommodate itself to social change, and on the other, to
accelerate such change, will be put to the test. The future of these
nations may depend on how well the challenge is met.
